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Abstract
People’s fairness preferences are an important constraint for what constitutes an
acceptable economic transaction, yet little is known about how these preferences are
formed. In this paper, we provide clean evidence that previous transactions play an
important role in shaping perceptions of fairness. Buyers used to high market prices,
for example, are more likely to perceive high prices as fair than buyers used to low
market prices. Similarly, employees used to high wages are more likely to perceive low
wages as unfair. Our data further allows us to decompose this history dependence
into the effects of pure observation vs. the experience of payoff-relevant outcomes. We
propose two classes of models of path-dependent fairness preferences—either based on
endogenous fairness reference points or based on shifts in salience—that can account
for our data. Structural estimates of both types of models imply a substantial deviation
from existing history-independent models of fairness. Our results have implications for
price discrimination, labor markets, and dynamic pricing.
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1 Introduction
A large body of evidence shows that people’s aversion toward unfair transactions can play
an important role in markets and negotiations. In product markets, consumers’ feelings of
entitlement restrict sellers’ ability to exploit changes in supply and demand (Kahneman et
al., 1986), while in labor markets, reciprocal gift exchange can lead to involuntary unem-
ployment (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr et al., 1993).1 To incorporate such non-pecuniary concerns
into economic theory, economists have proposed models of “social preferences,” which as-
sume that in addition to maximizing consumption, people also care about the fairness or
kindness of own or others’ actions. A common property of these models is that the fairness
or kindness of an action or outcome is evaluated by an exogenous and static criterion such as
equal division or surplus maximization, which implies that fairness judgments remain stable
over time and past experiences should not affect the evaluation criterion.2
In this paper, we show that such a static description of people’s feelings of entitlement
is incomplete. Our analysis is motivated by Kahneman et al. (1986), who argue that “when
there is a history of transactions between firm and transactor, the most recent price, wage,
or rent will be adopted for reference...” and that “terms of exchange that are initially seen as
unfair may in time acquire the status of a reference transaction.”3 The hypothesis is related
to the evidence on contrast effects in, e.g., judgments of the severity of crime (Pepitone and
DiNubile, 1976), attractiveness ratings (Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980), mate choice (Bhargava
and Fisman, 2014) and financial markets (Hartzmark and Shue, 2015). We posit that such
contrast effects operate in the domain of fairness as well. Consumers used to higher prices
are more likely to perceive high prices as fair; employees used to high wages are more likely
to perceive high wages as fair.
We also posit that such contrast effects stem from two broad types of experiences: per-
sonal payoff experience—the individually experienced payoffs resulting from a transaction—
and observational experience—the outcomes observed from (possibly someone else’s) transac-
tion.4 While observational experience and personal payoff experience are strongly correlated
1For a review of the evidence on labor markets, see Fehr et al. (2009).
2See, for example, Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and
Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Models including
reciprocity motives suggest a certain context dependence since the desire to treat someone kindly depends
on how they acted. But the evaluation of an agent’s kindness still requires a static criterion.
3It has also been suggested that fairness judgments can also be affected by exposure to different kinds of
bargaining environments (Binmore et al., 1991), or by investments into the production of the surplus that
is to be divided between parties (Handgraaf et al. (2003) or Zwick and Mak (2012)).
4Similar differentiations have been made in the learning literature. For example, experience-weighted
attraction learning (Camerer and Ho, 1999) assumes that more weight is given to directly experienced
outcomes than to counter-factual outcomes when updating attractions of actions in a reinforcement learning
type model.
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in some types of transactions, they can substantially differ in other types of transactions
such as posted offer markets with price discrimination, or in markets in which individuals
sometimes act as sellers and sometimes as buyers. Consequently, a second goal of this paper
is to quantify the importance of these two types of experience.
In our data—which involves a total of three experiments and 444 subjects—we find con-
siderable path-dependence in fairness preferences. Subjects who have been exposed to unfa-
vorable conditions towards themselves subsequently reveal less concern about being treated
unfairly than subjects who have been exposed to favorable conditions towards themselves.
We further find that observational experience accounts for more than half of this effect,
though personal payoff experience plays an important role as well.
To identify a causal link from past experience to fairness perceptions, we conducted a two-
phase experiment that exogenously varied experience in phase 1, and then used a simple game
to elicit subject’s fairness preferences in phase 2. In the first phase, all subjects participated
in one of two market games. In the proposer competition (PC) market (Roth et al., 1991),
two proposers offer a monetary allocation to one responder, who can choose to accept either
one or zero of those offers. In the responder competition (RC) market (Grosskopf, 2003),
one proposer makes an offer to two responders, who simultaneously choose whether or not
to accept the offer, with one responder randomly selected to transact in the case that both
responders accept. Consistent with previous evidence, competitive pressures forced proposers
in our experiment to give up most of their surplus in the PC market, while in the RC market,
proposers kept most of their surplus.
In the second phase of the experiment, proposers and responders were matched one-on-
one in a variant of the ultimatum game (Gu¨th et al., 1982), and proposers again made offers
to responders. Consistent with previous studies, responders were willing to reject an offer
and forgo significant monetary gains to punish proposers making unfair offers. However,
we find that responders’ experiences from the first part of the experiment had a significant
impact on what offers they were willing to accept. In period 1 of the ultimatum game, the
lowest acceptable offer of a responder who started in the PC market was on average 36%
higher than the lowest acceptable offer of a responder who started in the RC market. That
is, responders who started out in markets in which competition lead proposers to make very
favorable offers to the responders had a much higher standard for what constitutes a fair
and acceptable offer. We also find that this difference is persistent: over the course of 15
periods of repeated play, this difference dissipated by only about one-half of its period-one
value.
To further quantify the deviation from static fairness models, we postulate a simple
model of fairness preferences and estimate how its parameters depend on phase 1 outcomes.
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Under different assumptions about which aspects of people’s fairness preferences are shaped
by phase 1 experiences, our estimates imply that exposure to PC versus RC markets either
changes perceptions of what’s fair by about 50%, or changes sensitivity to unfairness by
about 50%.
To better understand how much of this effect is due to personal payoff experience vs.
observational experience, we conducted two additional experiments. The Role Switch ex-
periment was identical to the Baseline Experiment except that in phase 2, subjects who
were previously proposers in phase 1 became responders in phase 2, and vice versa. This
experiment is motivated by situations in which observational and personal payoff experience
differ because an individual does not occupy a single role in a market. The Full Information
experiment was identical to the Baseline Experiment except that in each round of phase 1,
subjects received feedback not only about their own offer and payoff, but they were also
informed about the average offer and acceptance rate in both markets. This experiment is
motivated by the divergence between observed and experienced offers that can occur when
the prices consumers pay for a particular good are different from the average price posted in
a market, as in the case of publicly known price discrimination.
Combining the Baseline experiment with either the Role Switch or the Full Information
experiment allows us to identify how much of the Baseline effect is driven by observational
versus personal payoff experience. We find that both matter. Our results show that 50-75%
of the path-dependence in fairness preferences is driven by observational experience, and
25-50% is driven by personal payoff experience.
Broadly, our results are consistent with the idea that contrast effects shape perceptions
of fairness. In Section 4 we discuss possible theories that could generate our effects. We
rule out standard theories of backwards-looking reference points for consumption bundles,
“simple anchoring,” and (rational) expectations-based reference points. We discuss more
likely explanations for our results: first, backwards-looking fairness reference points, and
second, endogenous salience weights on fairness vs. payoffs (as would be microfounded by
salience theory Bordalo et al. 2012, 2013, 2015).
Path dependence in people’s fairness preferences has immediate economic implications.
It predicts inertia in how markets respond to changes in economic conditions. A sudden and
major reduction in competition between sellers due to the exit of several competitors, for
example, would not be followed by an equally sudden and drastic increase in posted prices –
consumers used to low prices would not be willing to transact at significantly higher prices.
Benjamin (2015) explores the theoretical implications of path-dependent fairness preferences
in labor markets and shows how they can create downward wage stickiness, wage persistence
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within a firm, and other empirical regularities documented in labor markets.5 Second, path-
dependent fairness preferences generate new considerations for dynamic pricing strategies:
posting a high price today would have the added benefit of increasing consumers’ willingness
to pay a high price in the future. Third, our distinction between observational and personal
payoff experience reveals new implications for managing price discrimination via information
provision.
Generally, our paper is related to a nascent literature on preference formation and behav-
ioral spillovers.6 Falk et al. (2006) show that minimum wage laws can cause spillover effects,
raising wages even after the removal of the minimum wage law. Their results are consistent
with the idea that minimum-wage policies are viewed as strong and salient “wage guidelines,”
and provide evidence that people may infer social norms from government actions (e.g., Ben-
abou et al. 2012). We differ from Falk et al. (2006) in that appropriateness of actions is not
inferred from an authority; instead, we show that exogenous shocks to supply and demand
shape subsequent perceptions of fairness through the channel of contrast effects.7 Others
have shown that beliefs about opponents’ play can be influenced by observations of play
in similar games, possibly through belief- or best-response bundling (Grimm and Mengel,
2012; Bednar et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2011).8 We, on the other hand, isolate the effect
of past experience on subsequent judgments of fairness in a way that cannot be conflated
with strategic considerations.9 More generally, and importantly, our paper goes beyond the
5See also Skott (2005) for an analysis of how fairness norms impact wage formation, and Kaur (2012) who
formalizes the idea that workers may retaliate against a firm that offers them a wage below their reference
wage.
6Recent evidence shows that social preferences can be affected by environmental determinants such as
exposure to violence (see, e.g., Voors et al. (2012); Bauer et al. (2014); Cassar et al. (2012); Gilligan et al.
(2014)), school intervention programs (Bettinger and Slonim, 2006) or class composition Rao (2013).
7Although Falk et al. (2006) designed their experiment to directly speak to minimum wage policies im-
posed by the government, the minimum wage policy in their experiment was of course imposed by the
experimenter. The psychological mechanism, however, is essentially the same: subjects infer what is appro-
priate from the experimenter’s action. In fact, Falk et al. (2006) provide additional evidence that a simple
suggestion from the experiment about the appropriate wage has a significant impact on behavior. Addition-
ally, see, e.g., Silverman et al. (2014) for evidence on subjects inferring appropriateness from experimenter’s
actions.
8In the context of coordination games, Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2002) find that subjects who
were previously disadvantaged in a Hawk-Dove game are more likely to coordinate on cooperative outcomes
than subjects that were previously advantaged, and Le´vy-Garboua et al. (2009) show that history can serve
as focal point in multiple equilibria games. However, given the strategic nature of the interactions in these
experiments, these data are also consistent with the possibility that subjects have standard preferences
and best-respond to beliefs that are shaped by past experiences. An exception is the concurrent work
by Peysakhovich and Rand (2015), who show that subjects who have previously experienced cooperative
outcomes in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma not only act more cooperatively in strategic games,
but also share more in the dictator game.
9For example, in Falk et al. (2006), the marginal revenue generated by a worker depends on the ac-
cept/reject decisions of other workers. In turn, the gains from trade and the distribution of surplus depend
on other workers’ decisions. This implies that an indivudal worker’s behavior will not only be driven by his
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existing literature on behavioral spillovers by distinguishing between the separate roles of
observational and personal payoff experience, and by providing a direct and quantitative as-
sessment of how the parameters of commonly used models of fairness preferences are shaped
by past experiences.
Our work also contributes to a recent literature on the role of ex-ante agreements on
the evaluation of ex-post outcomes in bilateral negotiations (Hart and Moore, 2008; Hart,
2009; Hart and Holmstrom, 2010; Fehr et al., 2011, 2015; Brandts et al., forthcoming), which
argues that (potentially incomplete) contracts between two parties function as a reference
point when evaluating the fairness of the final outcomes of the interaction between the two
parties. Our notion of path-dependent fairness applies more broadly to environments in
which parties do not have the opportunity to write a contract prior to choosing actions. And
more importantly, we demonstrate that feelings of entitlement can endogenously be shaped
by prior transactions with other trading partners, simply by interacting in a particular market
environment.10
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our baseline experiment
and results. Section 3 extends the experimental design to differentiate between observational
experience and payoff experience. Section 4 discusses what theories can and can’t explain
our results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of further applications and open questions.
2 Baseline Experimental Setting and the Path-dependent
Fairness Hypothesis
2.1 Experimental design
All games in the experiment were based on the asymmetric ultimatum game, first introduced
by Kagel et al. (1996)11, and the market game first introduced by Roth et al. (1991). In each
own preferences, but also by his beliefs about the behavior of others.
10In fact, Hart and Moore (2008) discuss extensions of their model in which contrasts other than contractual
terms affect parties’ feelings of entitlement. Our work, therefore, paves the way toward more integrated
models of reference-dependent fairness, that apply more broadly to not only interactions within bilateral trade
agreements and organizations, but also within markets. An interesting insight from this strand of literature
is that competitive mechanisms (Fehr et al., 2011) and bilateral negotiations Brandts et al. (forthcoming) are
effective in shaping reference points, while exogenously assigned terms (Fehr et al., 2011) are not. This relates
to evidence that the mere presence of a market can change people’s motives to avoid moral transgressions or
to engage in socially responsible behavior (Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling et al., 2015a), and that competitive
mechanisms affect perceptions of fairness violations (Bartling et al., 2015b). This points towards a potential
interaction between the type of previous interaction and the outcome it generates in shaping path-dependent
fairness preferences, which is an interesting avenue for future research.
11This asymmetric ultimatum game is a variant of the original ultimatum game design first introduced by
Gu¨th et al. (1982).
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of these games, 100 chips must be divided between proposers and responders, with proposers
making offers, and responders choosing whether or not to accept the offers. These chips are
then converted into monetary payoffs, with different conversion rates for the proposer and the
responder. In our experiment, the monetary value of each chip was three times as high for a
proposer as it was for a responder.12 Our experimental design consists of three variants of the
asymmetric ultimatum game: (i) Proposer Competition (PC), (ii) Responder Competition
(RC) and (iii) no competition. Subjects participated in one of the two market games for the
first 15 periods of our experiment, and then participated in the non-competitive ultimatum
game in the next 15 periods. We describe the experimental games in more detail below.
2.1.1 Phase 1: Market Games
In the first phase of our experiment (first 15 periods), subjects participated in either a
responder competition treatment or in a proposer competition treatment.
In the responder competition (RC) market game, one proposer is matched with two
responders. The proposer first posts an offer of how to divide 100 chips between himself and
a responder.13 Each responder then observes the offer and, without knowing the decision of
the other responder, chooses whether or not to accept it. If both responders reject the offer,
all three subjects receive zero chips. If one responder accepts the offer and one responder
rejects the offer, the 100 chips are divided according to the proposed division between the
proposer and the responder who accepted the offer. The responder who rejects the offer
receives zero chips. If both responders accept the offer, it is randomly determined which
responder actually receives the offer, and the non-selected responder receives zero chips.
In the proposer competition (PC) market game, two proposers are matched with one
responder. Each proposer first posts an offer of how to divide 100 chips with the responder.
The responder observes both offers and can accept one or none of the offers. If both offers
are rejected, all three subjects receive zero chips. If an offer is accepted, the responder and
the proposer who made receive chips according to the proposed split. The proposer whose
offer was not accepted receives zero chips.
12We have chosen the asymmetric ultimatum game rather than the standard ultimatum game because
existing evidence on responder behavior shows that the variance in minimum acceptable offers is considerably
larger in the asymmetric ultimatum game than in the standard ultimatum game. Consequently, we considered
the asymmetric ultimatum game to be better suited for treatment manipulations that seek to affect responder
behavior.
13In all games, offers had to be multiples of 5 chips.
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2.1.2 Phase 2: Ultimatum Game
In the next phase of our experiment (next 15 periods), all subjects participated in a standard
version of the asymmetric ultimatum game for 15 periods. In this version, one proposer is
matched with one responder. First, the proposer makes an offer to the responder. Second,
the responder can accept or reject the offer. We did not elicit responders’ decisions in phase
2 in the same way that we elicited them in phase 1. Before responders are informed about
the actual offer, but after the offer is made, responders state a minimum acceptable offer
(MAO) amount; that is, each responder states a number x such that the proposer’s offer is
accepted if and only if he offers at least x chips to the responder. This minimum amount is
binding and directly enforced by the computer. As before, the proposed division of chips is
implemented if and only if the proposer’s offer is accepted, while both subjects received zero
chips if the proposed offer is rejected.14 Importantly, proposers are never informed ex-post
about the responder’s MAO, but only about whether the offer is accepted or rejected.
2.1.3 Procedures
At the beginning of each session, each subject was assigned to the role of proposer or re-
sponder, and this role was fixed throughout the experiment. Just before the first period,
one third of the proposers and two thirds of the responders were randomly assigned to the
proposer competition treatment. The remaining two thirds of the proposers and one third
of the responders were assigned to the responder competition treatment. Subjects stayed in
their respective treatment groups throughout all of phase 1 of the experiment. All subjects
received written instructions for their respective treatment, and were asked to answer several
understanding checks before proceeding with the experiment. After all subjects completed
the instructions and the understanding checks, they were asked to proceed to the first phase
of the experiment. Proposers and responders were randomly re-matched within their treat-
ment group after every period. The subjects were told that there would be a second phase
to the experiment, but were told nothing else about it other than that their choices in phase
1 would have no effect on their potential payoffs in phase 2.
Once the first phase of the experiment was finished, subjects received on-screen instruc-
tions for the ultimatum game without competition, and were again asked to work through
14Our use of the strategy method in phase 2 but not in phase 1 implies a difference in the responders’
choice sets between the two phases. In phase 1, responders are given choices A1 = {accept, reject}, while
in phase 2, they are given choices A2 = {0, 5, . . . , 100}. We did not use this strategy in phase 1, because
we didn’t want to exogenously impose rules about which offer must be chosen under proposer competition.
Also, note that eliciting MAO’s is technically not fully equivalent to the strategy method, since a responder’s
full strategy might be to accept an offer of x but reject an offer y > x. But as long as responders’ acceptance
preferences are monotonic, there is no loss of information in eliciting MAOs.
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several understanding checks. They were then divided into three different matching groups.
Each matching group contained one third of the proposers and one third of the responders
within a session. The first matching group consisted of proposers and responders who had
previously been in the proposer competition treatment (PC Matching Group). The second
matching group consisted of proposers and responders who had previously been in the re-
sponder competition treatment (RC Matching Group). Finally, the third matching group
consisted of the remaining third of proposers who had previously been in the proposer com-
petition treatment and the remaining third of responders who had previously been in the
responder competition treatment (Mixed Matching Group).15
Table 1: Overview of Matching Groups
Proposer Phase 1 Experience Responder Phase 1 Experience
PC Matching Group PC Proposers PC Responders
RC Matching Group RC Proposers RC Responders
Mixed Matching Group PC Proposers RC Responders
As a naming convention, we will refer to responders and proposers who have previously
participated in the proposer competition market as “PC Responders” and “PC Proposers”,
and to those who have participated in the responder competition market as “RC Responders”
and “RC Proposers”. The composition of the matching groups is summarized in table 1.
Subjects stayed within their respective matching groups throughout all 15 periods, but in
every period responders and proposers were randomly rematched within their matching
group, to rule out strategic incentives in the choice of the MAO.16 The matching groups
allow us to cleanly investigate the effect of responder experience on bargaining behavior,
holding proposer experience constant.
To avoid wealth effects potentially confounding or interfering with our treatment manip-
ulation, either phase 1 or phase 2 was selected for payment at the end of the experiment.17
Within the chosen phase, 4 periods were selected at random.18 The points earned in the
selected periods were then converted into Swiss Francs, with the exchange rate of points to
15Subjects were fully informed about all aspects of the games they directly participated in, but they were
not informed about the respective other market game. In phase 2, subjects were therefore not informed
about the market history of their matches.
16We therefore implemented a stranger and not a perfect stranger matching protocol. However, evidence
suggests that subjects treat these protocols similarly. In their meta-analysis of ultimatum game behavior,
Cooper and Dutcher (2011) find no evidence of different behavior between stranger and perfect stranger
protocols.
17In an expected utility framework, the independence axiom implies that our payoff structure guarantees
that phase 1 history should be irrelevant to people’s preferences over phase 2 outcomes.
18We selected 4 periods rather than 1 to reduce the variance in subject payments in case phase 1 of the
experiment was selected for payment (which otherwise would have been very large).
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Swiss Francs set at 10:1.
In total, we ran 5 sessions of the Baseline Experiment, totaling to 150 subjects.19 Experi-
ments were computerized using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the
experimental laboratory of the University of Zurich. Our subject pool consisted primarily of
students at the University of Zurich and the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.20 On
average, an experimental session lasted 75 minutes with an average payment of CHF 38.5
($42.00), including a show-up fee of CHF 10.21
2.2 Conceptual Framework for the Path-dependent Fairness Hy-
pothesis
We formalize our hypotheses with an intentionally simple extension of the well-known social
preference models introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999; henceforth FS), Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000, henceforth BO), and Charness and Rabin (2002, henceforth CR). Like, FS, BO,
CR, we capture several key properties of fairness preferences using a maximally tractable
model.
We consider an N -player game in which we let pii denote each player’s final monetary
payoff. We let player i’s utility be given by
Ui = pii − β(h)max (r(h)Π− pii, 0)− α(h)max (pii − r(h)Π, 0) ,
where Π =
∑
j pij is the total surplus, and h is the experienced and/or observed history of
offers and payoffs. Here, r is the share of the total surplus a player feels entitled to, or what
BO call the “perceived social reference point”. Concretely, our model is a piecewise-linear
version of BO’s ERC model. The parameters α ∈ [0, 1] and β > α capture, respectively, the
disutility associated with player i feeling that he got more or less than what he feels he is
entitled to.22
Both FS and BO focus on equity theories in which perceptions of fairness are based on a
fixed, exogenously given equity norm that is not shaped by past experience. In the context
19Because differences in past experience are a crucial variable in our design, we only invited subjects who
have not previously participated in ultimatum game experiments.
20Subjects were drawn from a database of volunteers using ORSEE Greiner (2004).
21In all sessions, we also elicited beliefs of proposers and responders about average offers and average
acceptable offers. Moreover, at the end of the experiment, all subjects participated in the cognitive reflection
test (Frederick, 2005). Subjects received an additional CHF 5 for these tests. We report results with respect
to these measures in an earlier working paper version of this paper Herz and Taubinsky (2013). Because
they are not essential for any of our results, we do not further discuss these measures in this paper.
22Following CR and others, we make the assumption α ≤ 1 to capture the idea that a player won’t ever
burn ∆ of his money just so he doesn’t get more than his fair share.
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of our specific formal model, this would translate into r(h) = 1/N for all players in an N -
player game, irrespective of past experiences. We, however, do not set r(h) equal to 1/N
but instead allow for the possibility that it may be shaped by past experience h.23
Similarly, FS and BO assume fixed and exogenous preference parameters α and β. Al-
ternatively, the sensitivity to (un)fairness may be history-dependent. One mechanism for
this is shifts in salience based on previous experiences, as in, e.g., Bordalo et al. (2015). We
provide this microfoundation in Appendix C.
What are the testable implications of path-dependent fairness preferences? For phase 1
of our experiment, the possibility that r, α and β are potentially shaped by past experience
does not generate sharp testable implications. In Appendix A, we generalize the FS and
BO theoretical results about fairness and market competition, and show that in our more
general framework, proposer competition still drives proposer surplus to zero, while responder
competition drives responder surplus to zero.
In phase 2, behavior is much more sensitive to the social referent r and the sensitivity to
negative inequality β. In the context of our experimental payoffs, simple algebra shows that
the smallest offer a responder is willing to accept is given by
MAO(r) =
300βr
2βr + β + 1
, (1)
which is a strictly increasing function of r and β. Thus if experience affects either of these
parameters, then it should have a direct effect on the minimally acceptable offers (MAO’s)
of responders.
Our basic hypothesis is that responders who are used to receiving low offers in phase 1 will
have lower minimal acceptable offers than responders who are used to receiving relatively
high offers from proposers, either because of a lower reference point or because fairness
concerns are less salient to them.
Our analysis of phase 2 behavior will focus on responders because their behavior is solely
a function of the preference parameters β and r, rather than strategic considerations about
other players’ behavior. Proposers’ behavior, by contrast, is shaped by their beliefs about
responder behavior, in addition to their social preferences.24 We thus focus most of the
analysis on responders’ MAO’s, but return to exploring proposer behavior in Section 3.5.
23In principle, r(h) could be a function of more then just past experience. As noted in footnote 3,
entitlements have also been shown to be affected by ex-ante investments into the production of the surplus
that is to be divided. Our framework could be amended to also capture such influences. For simplicity and
tractability, however, we will solely focus on past experience as a determinant of fairness preferences.
24Letting Q(a) denote a proposer’s belief that his offer a will be accepted, the proposer chooses a to
maximize
3(100− a)Q(a)− βmax [r(300− 2a)− 3(100− a), 0]− αmax [r(300− 2a)− a, 0] (2)
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2.3 Behavior in the Phase 1 Market Treatment
Our phase 1 treatment variation was successful in inducing large, exogenous differences in
phase 1 experience. As expected, competition had a strong effect on offers in the first phase
of our experiment. Averaged over all 15 periods, proposers offered 78 chips to responders
in the PC market, whereas they offered only 31 chips to responders in the RC market. The
development of offers over the course of the 15 periods in both treatments is shown in the
left panel of figure 1. The difference between offers in the two treatments is roughly 23
chips in period 1, and increases over time until it reaches an average of 50 chips from period
7 onwards. The average difference in offers between the markets is 46.7 chips, and this
difference is highly statistically significant in a regression of offers on a PC market dummy,
with standard errors clustered at the level of phase 1 market / session pairs.
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Figure 1: Left Panel: Average offers over time under responder competition (RC Market)
and under proposer competition (PC Market) in phase 1 of the Baseline experiment. Right
Panel: Acceptance rates of responders over time under responder competition and under
proposer competition in phase 1 of the Baseline experiment.
The right panel of figure 1 shows that the probability that an offer was accepted. In
the PC market, responders accept one of the two offers in 99.2 percent of the time. In the
RC market, responders accept the offers 76.8 percent of the time, and the probability that
at least one of the responders accepts an offer is 92.5 percent. Thus in both markets, a
successful transaction occurs over 90 percent of the time. Our stark results on the effects of
competitive forces are consistent with Roth et al. (1991), Grosskopf (2003) and Fischbacher
Equation 2 shows that interpreting the impact of phase 1 experience on proposers’ offers can be problematic
for two reasons: First, it is unclear whether phase 1 experience affects Q(a) or one of the preference parame-
ters. Second, all models of fairness assume that people are more concerned about being “behind” than about
being “ahead”; i.e., α < β. But if α is small relative to β, then changes in r will have a smaller impact on
proposers’ offers than on responders’ MAO’s, and changes in β are not detectable at all in proposer behavior.
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et al. (2009). Our two market treatments thus generate substantial exogenous variation in
phase 1 experience for testing the path-dependent fairness hypothesis in phase 2.
2.4 Behavior in Phase 2: The Effect of Phase 1 Experience on
Responder Behavior in Phase 2
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Figure 2: Minimum Acceptable Offers of responders. “PC Responders” denotes responders
who have participated in the PC market in phase 1. “RC Responders” denotes responders
who have participated in the RC market in phase 1. The figure shows average minimum
acceptable offers for PC responders and RC responders over the course of the second part of
the experiment. The dashed lines show the linear time trends.
Figure 2 plots responders’ minimal acceptable offers. In every period of phase 2, average
minimal acceptable offers are larger for PC Responders, and the difference is particularly
pronounced in early periods.
To quantify the effect of phase 1 experience on responder MAO’s, we estimate OLS
regressions of individual MAO’s on phase 1 market dummies. Table 2 shows results of
such regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the phase 1 market matching
group. Column (1) shows the average treatment effect in period 1, whereas column (2)
shows the average treatment effect over all 15 periods. Column (1) shows that responders
that have previously been in the proposer competition market (indicated by the dummy
“PC Responder”) have minimum acceptable offers that are 13 chips higher than responders
who have previously been in the responder competition market, which translates to PC
13
Table 2: The Impact of Responder Experience on minimal acceptable offers (MAO) in the
Baseline Experiment
(1) (2)
MAO MAO
PC Responder 13.00** 10.19*
(4.21) (4.92)
PC Proposer –3.23
(7.49)
Constant 36.00*** 37.41***
(2.90) (4.68)
Adj. R2 0.06 0.04
Observations 75 1125
The regression in column (1) includes observations from period 1 only. The regression in column (2) includes
observations from all periods. PC Responder is a dummy variable indicating whether a responder participated
in the PC market in phase 1. PC proposer is a dummy variable indicating whether the matched proposers
participated in the PC market in phase 1. PC Proposer is only controlled for in column (2), since responders
had no interaction with their matches in phase 2 prior to entering their period 1 MAO. Controlling for PC
Proposer in column (1) leads to insignificance of the PC Proposer dummy and leaves significance of the
PC Responder dummy unchanged (regressions not reported here). Robust standard errors are clustered by
phase 1 market matching groups (2 clusters per session, 10 clusters in total). Significance levels: ∗∗∗ = 1%,
∗∗ = 5% and ∗ = 10%.
Responders stating minimum acceptable offers that are 36 percent higher than the acceptable
offers of RC Responders. This difference is significant at the 5% level. Column (2) shows
that the effect of phase 1 experience remains significant at the 10% level even when all 15
periods are considered.
Figure 3 plots regression coefficients corresponding to the difference in MAO’s between PC
and RC responders in each period.25 The figure shows that the effect of phase 1 experience
decays only slightly to about 10 chips over the course of the 15 periods.26 Intuitively,
differences in MAO’s in period 1 of phase 2 capture the direct effect of the exogenous variation
in phase 1 experience. In periods t > 1 in phase 2, however, both RC and PC responders
begin to play the same game, and thus their experiences begin to become more similar.
Consequently, their history-dependent fairness preferences are expected to converge.27
2515 regressions identical to the regression in column (2) of table 2 were conducted, one for each period.
The figure shows the coefficient on the PC Responder dummy.
26We also ran a regression interacting the PC Responder dummy with period, to estimate a linear time
trend. We find that the coefficient on PC Responder is decreasing by 0.44 percentage points per period, and
this negative time trend is significant at the 10% level.
27We demonstrate this point formally for the case of path-dependent fairness reference points in Appendix
D.
14
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15A
ve
ra
ge
 M
A
O
 
Period 
Figure 3: This figure shows the development of the coefficient on PC responder over time,
individually estimated for every period using the same regression specification as in column
(1) of table 2. The regressions also include PC proposer dummies, to control for any potential
impact of proposer experience. However, as already evident in column (2) of table 2, these
dummies are insignificant. Performing the same regressions without these dummies does not
significantly alter the results. The dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Robust
standard errors are clustered by the phase 1 market treatment group (2 clusters per session,
10 clusters in total).
2.5 Impacts of Phase 1 Experience on Parameters of the Fairness
Model
The MAO analysis provides clear evidence of path-dependence of social preferences, but it
does not provide clear guidance about the magnitude of path-dependence in terms of the
parameters of fairness models. To quantify how much the parameters in classical fairness
models such as those of FS, BO, and CR can be shaped by past experience, we now estimate
how phase 1 experience shapes either the phase 2 fairness reference point r or the sensitivity
to negative inequality β in equation (1). As with our reduced-form results, our goal with
the structural estimation strategy is to utilize only exogenous variation created by our two
phase 1 treatments, rather than to utilize all (potentially endogenous) variation in MAO’s
in phases 1 and 2. The equations that utilize only treatment-level differences to identify the
parameters are:
MAOj,it =
300βjrj
2βjrj + βj + 1
+ it (3)
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Table 3: Structural Estimates of fairness preference parameters in the Baseline Experiment
Estimates for r Estimates for β
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ 0.11*** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03)
β 0.67*** 0.58***
(0.07) (0.06)
βRC 0.46*** 0.46***
(0.07) (0.04)
βPC 0.94*** 0.72***
(0.16) (0.14)
Observations 75 1125 75 1125
Columns (1) and (2) contain estimates for ρ and β, where rPC = 0.5 + ρand rRC = 0.5 − ρ. Column (1)
uses period 1 data only. Column (2) uses data from all periods. Column (3) contains estimates of βRC and
βPC using period 1 data only, whereas column (4) uses data from all periods. Robust standard errors are
clustered by phase 1 market matching groups (2 clusters per session, 10 clusters in total). Significance levels:
∗∗∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5% and ∗ = 10%.
where j = {RC,PC}, the subscript RC is used for parameters of RC responders, the sub-
script PC is used for parameters of PC responders, MAORC,it and MAOPC,it are the MAOs
of a responder i in period t in RC and PC markets, respectively, and it is a mean zero person-
period specific error term. Reformulating and setting E[it] = 0, our exogenous variation in
phase 1 market experience then gives us two moment conditions, containing a total of four
parameters (βRC , rRC , βPC , rPC) that cannot be identified simultaneously. Intuitively, our
data cannot distinguish whether MAOs are higher because the reference point r is higher or
because the sensitivity parameter β is higher. We thus consider two different simplifications
of the model.
First, we assume that βRC = βPC ≡ β, and estimate how the reference point r would
have to change to accommodate the observed behavior. This leaves us with three parameters,
which we reduce to two by setting rRC = 1/2− ρ and rPC = 1/2 + ρ.
Second we set rPC = rRC = 1/2, and estimate how the sensitivity parameters βRC and
βPC must differ to accommodate the observed behavior. We perform our estimation using the
method of moments. Given the two-parameter vector ξ = (β, ρ) or ξ = (βRC , βPC), let m(ξ)
denote the theoretical vector of moments corresponding to the two equations above. Because
our model is exactly identified, the estimation procedure here is simple: for observed moments
mˆ, the method of moments estimator chooses the parameter vector ξˆ for which m(ξˆ) = mˆ.
As with the reduced-form regressions, we compute robust standard errors clustered at the
phase 1 market level for each session.
Table 3 presents our results, computed using the Gauss-Newton algorithm. Column (1)
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estimates ρ and β using data from period 1 only, while column (2) estimates ρ and β using
data from all 15 periods. We note that the estimates in column (2) do not capture the
full dynamics of preferences, which may evolve period by period over the course of phase 2.
However, because our exogenous variation comes from Phase 1 only, we do not have sufficient
variation to identify the full dynamics over the course of Phase 2. Rather, the question we ask
is what fixed pair (rRC , rPC) best rationalizes the aggregate behavior in Phase 2. In section
3, however, we will specify a functional form for the evolution of preferences over time, and
estimate the parametrized dynamics. Columns (3) and (4) estimate βRC and βPC , again
using either only period 1 data (column (3)) or the data from all 15 periods (column(4)).
Column (1) shows an estimate of ρ = 0.1, suggesting that exogenous variation in expe-
rience as extreme as the difference between the two markets can change the entitlement r
by about 30%-50%: RC market experience generates r ≈ 0.4, while PC market experience
generates r ≈ 0.6. This difference in r is significant at p < 0.01. When using data from
all periods in column (2), the difference is smaller, but still significant at p < 0.05. That
the differences become attenuated over time is not surprising, and arises naturally from a
dynamic extension of our model, presented in Appendix D. These structural estimates show
that the deviation from FS, BO, and CR type models—in which there is an exogenous equity
norm r = 1/2 in a two player game like phase 2 of our experiment—is not only statistically
significant, but also economically significant and large in magnitude.
If we fix the fairness reference point instead, and assume that our treatment affects
responders sensitivity to negative inequality β, we find similarly stark results. Column (3),
which uses only period 1 data, shows that βPC = 0.94, which is more than twice as large
as βRC = 0.46. The difference between these estimates is significant at p < 0.01. When
we use data from all 15 periods, the estimate for βPC decreases modestly to 0.72, while the
estimate for βRC remains largely unchanged at 0.46. The difference in these estimates is still
significant at p = 0.059.
3 Unpacking the Channels of Experience Effects
3.1 Conceptual Framework
Our baseline experiment demonstrates that responders’ preferences are influenced by phase
1 experiences. However, our experimental design in phase 1 does not allow us to differentiate
between the possible influences of two broad types of experiences generated by our market
games: observational experience and personal payoff experience.
We define observational experience as the average offer observed in the phase 1 market.
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This type of observation is independent of an individual’s role in the market, the specific offer
at which an individual transacted, and the extent to which an individual even participated
in the market at all.28
Additionally, preferences may also be shaped by one’s own, specific personal payoff ex-
perience. Regardless of what is the average price of some good, what a person considers a
reasonable price to buy at may depend on the specific share of the surplus that he had been
receiving in previous transactions. A person used to buying at low prices may feel averse to
buying at high prices because he is not used to giving up most of the transaction surplus.
We call this type of experience personal payoff experience, and it is defined as the average
share of the group’s total payoff in each round of the market or ultimatum games.
In our Baseline Experiment, these two components of experience are almost perfectly
correlated. Proposer competition generates high offers, which generates both high obser-
vational and high personal payoff experience for responders. To separate the potentially
differential impact of observational and personal payoff experience, we therefore ran two
additional experiments, the Role Switch experiment and the Full Information experiment.
Both experiments are motivated by two economically meaningful ways in which observa-
tional experience and personal payoff experience differ. First, they may differ substantially
for individuals who don’t occupy a single role in a market. Consider previous employees who
worked for low wages and transition to the role of employer and compare them to employers
in a low wage market who transition to the role of an employee. They will observe the same
market outcomes—they both participated in a market with low wages—but their personal
payoff experiences will likely differ. Our Role Switch experiment is motivated by this kind
of role reversal.
Our Full Information experiment is motivated by situations in which observational and
personal payoff experience can differ substantially when the price a consumer pays for a
particular good is different from the average price posted on the market. Suppose, for
example, that a consumer faces price discrimination, but can fully observe the menu of
prices that a monopolist is offering on the market. This price-discriminating monopolist
sells a widget for $10 to one group of consumers and for $20 to another group of consumers,
and this price-discrimination is known to everyone in the market. Here, both the $10 and
$20 consumers will observe the same set of prices but, by definition, they will have different
personal payoff experiences.
28In principle, observed acceptance or rejection could matter as well. However, acceptance rates in both
market games are very high, and we do not have exogenous variation in acceptance rates conditional on
offers. Hence, we focus on observed offers in our analysis. The impact of acceptance on fairness reference
points may be an interesting avenue for future research.
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3.2 Design of the Role Switch and the Full Information Experi-
ments
3.2.1 The Role Switch Experiment
Phase 1 of the Role Switch experiment was identical to phase 1 of the Baseline experiment.
Once phase 1 was finished, subjects were presented with a new set of instructions for phase
2 of the experiment. However, in the Role Switch experiment all subjects that were assigned
to the responder role in phase 1 were re-assigned to the proposer role in phase 2, and all
subjects that were assigned to the proposer role in phase 1 were re-assigned to the responder
role in phase 2. The role switch reverses the correlation between personal payoff experience
and observational experience relative to the Baseline experiment, since proposers in the RC
market observe low offers, but receive high payment shares, and vice versa. Other than the
role reassignment, phase 2 was equivalent to phase 2 of the Baseline experiment.
In total, 4 sessions of the Role Switch experiment were conducted. 30 subjects partici-
pated in each session, leading to a total of 120 subjects who participated in the Role Switch
experiment. Sessions lasted approximately 1-1.25h and subjects on average earned 36.4 CHF
(approx. 40 USD) including a 10 CHF show up fee.29
3.2.2 The Full Information Experiment
The Full Information experiment differed from the Baseline experiment in the feedback given
to subjects during phase 1. After every period of phase 1, all subjects were informed about
the average offer as well as the average acceptance rate in both the PC market and the
RC market.30 Consequently, in the Full Information experiment, observational experience
is held constant for all subjects, independent of the market they have been assigned to in
phase 1. Phase 2 of the Full Information experiment was again similar to phase 2 of the
Baseline experiment.
29In the Role Switch experiment, subjects’ offer screen featured lists that included all possible offers respec-
tively minimal acceptable offers. This is a difference to the Baseline experiment, in which proposers simply
entered numbers. We did this to actually make our phase 2 responders’ decision format more comparable to
the format in the Baseline experiment. In the baseline experiment, responders first made binary decisions
in phase 1, and then selected an MAO in phase 2. This design choice minimized the possibility of mindless
anchoring, in the sense that subjects might simply continue entering the same number over and over again,
irrespective of what phase of the experiment they’re in. In the Role Switch experiment, we similarly wanted
the phase 2 responders (who are phase 1 proposers) to make binary choices in phase 1, so as to minimize the
possibility of mindless anchoring on phase 1 choices. This slight change of format did not alter the phase 1
behavior, as shown in Appendix I.
30In contrast to the other two experiments, subjects were therefore fully informed about the two simul-
taneously conducted markets in phase 1 of the experiment. During the experiment and in the instructions,
the two different types of markets were not referred to as “proposer competition market” and “responder
competition market”, but as “market of type X” and “market of type Y”, respectively.
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In total, 6 sessions of the Full Information experiment were conducted. 24 or 30 subjects
participated in each session, leading to a total of 174 subjects who participated in the Full
Information experiment. Sessions lasted approximately 1-1.25 h and subjects on average
earned 36.75 CHF (approx. 41 USD), including a 10 CHF show up fee.
3.2.3 The Six Experimental Conditions
Table 4: Overview of treatment variation for phase 2 responders across all three experiments
Observational experience
High High&Low Low
High personal payoff experience PC Responders PC Responders RC Proposers
(Baseline) (Full Info) (Role Switch)
Low personal payoff experience PC Proposers RC Responders RC Responders
(Role Switch) (Full Info) (Baseline)
Table 4 summarizes how our three experiments allow us to separately identify the effects
of observational experience and personal payoff experience. Roughly, our three experiments
generate six different cells: (high vs. low personal payoff experience) × (high vs. high &
low vs. low observational experience). PC responders in the Baseline experiment and in
the Full Information experiment, as well as RC proposers in the Role Switch experiment are
categorized into “high personal payoff experience”, whereas RC responders in the Baseline
experiment and the Full Information experiment, as well as PC proposers in the Role Switch
experiment are categorized into “low personal payoff experience”. PC responders in the
Baseline experiment as well as PC proposers in the Role Switch experiment are categorized
into “high observational experience”, and RC responders in the Baseline experiment as well
as RC proposers in the Role Switch experiment are categorized into “low observational
experience”. All subjects from the Full Information experiment are categorized as having
observed both high & low offers.
Table 5 summarizes the average observational and personal payoff experience in phase 1
for each treatment group in each experiment. The table shows that our exogenous treatment
variation indeed had the expected effects.
3.3 Impact of Payoff and Observational Experience on MAOs
To formalize the notion of personal payoff experience, let µti = pi
t
i/Π
t denote the share of
period t surplus that player i receives, and let µ¯τ =
∑τ−1
t=1 µ
t/(τ − 1) denote the average
of these experiences. In the case that Πt = 0, we set µti = 0, to reflect our intuition that
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Table 5: Summary statistics of observational experience and personal payoff experience by
treatment and experiment
Personal payoff experience Observational experience
Baseline PC Responders 0.63 0.57
Baseline RC Responders 0.07 0.14
Role Switch PC Proposers 0.19 0.58
Role Switch RC Proposers 0.70 0.22
Full Information PC Responders 0.66 0.43
Full Information RC Responders 0.07 0.43
receiving a zero payoff should lower one’s feelings of entitlement.31
Second, we formalize observational experience. Given offers at1,a
t
2, . . . a
t
n observed by some
player j in period t, let νtj =
1
n
∑
i
ati
piP (a
t
i)+a
t
i
denote the average normalized offer observed by
player j. Note that the quantity
ati
piP (a
t
i)+a
t
i
has a simple interpretation: it is the share of
the surplus that has been offered. Let ν¯τ =
∑τ−1
t=1 ν
t/(τ − 1) denote the average of these
observations.
In this section, we examine the impact that µ¯τ and ν¯τ have on phase 2 behavior. Although
µ¯τ and ν¯τ are very simple summary statistics of experience, in appendix F we also show that
our empirical results are robust to considering weighted averages of past experiences and
observations: µ¯τ =
∑
δtµt/
∑
δt and ν¯τ =
∑
δtνt/
∑
δt.
We begin by summarizing the behavior conditional on the treatment.32 Figures 4 and 5
show the average MAOs for the different combinations of observational and personal payoff
experience, as described in table 4. Figure 4 summarizes the data in a way that makes
transparent the impact of observational experience. The top panel shows the effect of obser-
vational experience, pooling data across low and high personal payoff experience. The two
bottom panels show the effect of observational experience, conditional on low (panel (b))
and high (panel (c)) personal payoff experience. Figure 5, on the other hand, summarizes
the data in a way that makes transparent the impact of personal payoff experience. The top
panel shows the average effect of personal payoff experience, pooling across all experimental
conditions. The three bottom panels show the effect of personal payoff experience, condi-
31An alternative intuition is that in an N -player group, µti = 1/N when Π
t = 0, to reflect the possibility
that when everyone gets the same payoff (even when it’s zero), the player feels like it was such an equitable
outcome that his subsequent feelings of entitlement move towards him getting an even share of the surplus.
In Appendix F, we show that our results are nearly identical under this alternative specification.
32In Appendix I, we show that the phase 1 outcomes in these two additional experiments are very similar
to the phase 1 outcomes in the Baseline experiment. Market forces work as expected and drive up offers in
the PC markets, whereas they drive down offers in the RC markets, again leading to substantial exogenous
variation in experiences. In the rest of our analysis, we thus focus on phase 2 only.
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Figure 4: Minimal Acceptable offers by personal payoff experience. The top panel (a) pools
data from all treatments, independent of observational experience. The bottom panels con-
dition on either low personal payoff experience (b), high and low observational experience (c)
or high personal payoff experience (d). See table 4 for the respective treatment descriptions.
tional on low (panel (b)), high and low (panel (c)), and high observational experience (panel
(d)).
To statistically analyze the effect of personal payoff experience and observational expe-
rience on responder MAO’s separately, we first analyze the Baseline and the Role Switch
experiments in isolation, and then analyze the Baseline and Full Information experiments in
isolation. We estimate instrumental variables regressions using our six treatment conditions
(the random assignment to the RC and the PC market in each of our 3 experiments) as
instruments for responder personal payoff experience and observational experience. We use
instrumental variable regressions instead of OLS regressions because there is simultaneity
bias at the matching group level: Responders’ and proposers’ preferences shape the out-
comes in phase 1 in their respective matching groups, and those outcomes will be related to
Phase 2 outcomes not just through the causal experience channel, but also simply because
of within-subject–and thus within-matching-group–correlation in behavior.33
33To put in another way: for the same reason that we can not test our path-dependence hypothesis by
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Figure 5: Minimal Acceptable offers by observational experience. The top panel (a) pools
data from all treatments, independent of personal payoff experience. The bottom panels
condition on either low personal payoff experience (b) or high personal payoff experience (c).
See table 4 for the respective treatment descriptions.
Because our standard errors are not homoscedastic, we use the more efficient iterative
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Hall, 2005) instead of the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimator. Our 6 moment conditions are E[(MAO−β0−β1µ¯−β2ν¯)Tj] = 0,
where Tj is a dummy variable for one of the six phase 1 treatment conditions and µ¯ =∑15
t=1 µ
t/15 and ν¯ =
∑15
t=1 ν
t/15 are the average of phase 1 observational experience and
personal payoff experience. Our estimates here do not account for the fact that our framework
predicts that preferences should be changing throughout phase 2 as well. Rather, the question
we ask is how do phase 1 observational and payoff experiences affect behavior in phase 2, on
simply having subjects play 15 rounds of an ultimatum game and then regressing their MAO’s on past
experience, we can’t simply regress MAOs on past experience even when we have an additional source of
true exogenous variation. The instrumental variables regression allow us to focus on the exogenous variation
only. That said, the results are very similar when running OLS regressions, suggesting that most of the
variation in phase 1 experience is generated by our random assignment to different markets.
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average.
Table 6: The impact of observational and personal payoff experience on responder minimal
acceptable offers (MAO)
Baseline and Role Baseline and Full All
Switch Exp. only Information Exp. only Experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MAO MAO MAO MAO MAO MAO
Obs. experience 26.69*** 15.74*** 20.94 21.44* 23.93 ***15.95 ***
(7.00) (5.31) (14.80) (11.60) (6.57) (5.11)
P. payoff experience 9.40 11.05 15.57 6.20 9.62 ** 10.85 **
(7.16) (6.82) (10.19) (9.03) (4.33) (5.36)
Constant 30.73*** 38.76*** 35.93*** 36.08*** 32.91 ***39.16 ***
(5.50) (3.97) (3.87) (3.51) (3.05) (3.19)
Adj. R2 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05
Observations 135 2025 162 2430 222 3330
Instrumental variables regressions estimating the impact of phase 1 personal payoff experience and obser-
vational experience on phase 2 MAO’s. Estimates computed using the iterative GMM estimator. Columns
(1) to (4) report results of pairwise combinations of the Baseline Experiment data with data from the Role
Switch and the Full Information experiments, respectively. In column, personal payoff experience and ob-
servational experience are instrumented using 4 dummies, one for each phase 1 market treatment in each
experiment. Columns (1) and (3) contain observations from period 1 of phase 2 only. Columns (2) and
(4) contain data from all periods. Columns (5) and (6) combine data from all experiments. Here, personal
payoff experience and observational experience are therefore instrumented using 6 dummies. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered by phase 1 market matching group (2 clusters per session, 18 clusters in total in
columns (1) and (2), 22 clusters in total in columns (3) and (4), 30 clusters in total in columns (5) and (6)).
Significance levels: ∗∗∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5% and ∗ = 10%. Columns (1) and (2) additionally contain dummies for
high proposer personal payoff experience and high proposer observational experience. Columns (3) and (4)
additionally contain a dummy for high proposer personal payoff experience (including proposer observational
experience dummies would lead to collinearity, because high and low observational experience is unique to
the Full Information experiment). Regressions in columns (5) and (6) additionally contain dummy variables
for proposer personal payoff experience and for proposer observational experience.
Columns (1)-(4) of table 6 report the results, focusing on period 1 only in columns (1)
and (3) and using data from all fifteen periods in columns (2) and (4). Although pooling
data from only 2 out of 3 experiments doesn’t always give us enough power to reach sta-
tistical significance at conventional thresholds, the regressions in the table are consistent in
showing a large effect of both personal payoff experience and observational experience on
responders’ MAO’s. What is also noteworthy is that the effects of past observational and
payoff experience do not appear to differ much across the Role Switch experiment and the
Full Information experiment. The impact of observational experience in the Role Switch
experiment appears to be similar in magnitude to the effect of observational experience in
the Full Information experiment.
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Columns (5) and (6) of table 6 pool all three experiments for greater power and report
reduced-form estimates of the impact of phase 1 observational experience and personal payoff
experience on responder MAO’s. Column (5) again focuses on period 1, while column (6) uses
data from all 15 periods. In these pooled regressions, we again find that both observational
experience and personal payoff experience have considerable effects, and this time we have
enough power to reject the null hypothesis of no effect at p < 0.05 for personal payoff
experience and at p < 0.01 for observational experience. Moreover, the estimates of the
impact of observational experience and personal payoff experience are again very similar to
the estimates in columns (1)-(4).
To get a rough sense of magnitudes, the regressions imply that a 10 percentage points
increase in the average personal payoff experience increases first period minimum acceptable
offers by approximately 1 chip. Similarly, a 10 percentage points increase in observed average
offers increases first period minimum acceptable offers by another 2.4 chips. As expected,
these effects are smaller when using data from all 15 periods, but they remain statistically
significant.
Figure 6 shows how the effects of observational experience and personal payoff experience
develop over the course of the 15 periods in phase 2 of the experiments. The left panel plots
the coefficient estimate for observational experience, individually estimated for every period,
similar to the regression for period 1 in column (5) of table 6. Dashed lines indicate 95%
confidence intervals of the parameter estimates. Observational experience has a large and
significant impact on minimal acceptable offers until period 8. In later periods, the effect
gets smaller and is no longer significant at the 5% level. The right panel shows equivalent
coefficient estimates for personal payoff experience. The effect of personal payoff experience
remains relatively stable over the course of the 15 periods, with a slight downward trend.
3.4 Implications for Parameters of the Fairness Model
To quantitatively compare our framework with standard social preferences models that as-
sume fixed fairness preferences, we now estimate the role that personal payoff experience
and observational experience play in shaping either the reference point or the sensitivity pa-
rameters in equation (1). We do not consider our analysis here “structural” in the standard
sense. Rather, we estimate linear models of how the fairness parameters—r, β, α—seem to
depend on the history. In this sense, our analysis is analogous to the analysis in Section 3.3.
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Figure 6: Top Panel: Development of the observational experience parameter over time, in-
dividually estimated for every period using the same IV regression specification as in column
(5) of table 6. Bottom panel: Development of the personal payoff experience parameter over
time, individually estimated for every period. Robust standard errors are clustered by the
phase 1 market treatment group (2 clusters per session, 30 clusters in total). The dotted
lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
3.4.1 Fairness Reference Points
We model a responder’s period τ reference point as being given by rR(µ¯
τ
i , ν¯
τ
i ). Similarly, we
model a proposer’s period τ reference point as being given by rP (µ¯
τ
i , 1− ν¯τi ).
To produce a tractable and estimable functional form, we assume that the reference
point is formed through a convex combination of the average observational experience and
the average personal payoff experience. Thus for responders,
rR = (1− γPE − γOE)(1/2) + γPE
τ−1∑
t=1
µt/(τ − 1) + γOE
τ−1∑
t=1
νt/(τ − 1) (4)
where γPE and γOE are the weights on personal payoff experience and observational experi-
ence. Similarly, for proposers,
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rP = (1− γPE − γOE)(1/2) + γPE
τ−1∑
t=1
µt/(τ − 1) + γOE
τ−1∑
t=1
(1− νt)/(τ − 1) (5)
The fairness sensitivity parameters are assumed to be exogenous, with β = β0 and α = α0
for constants α0 and β0.
3.4.2 Sensitivity to (Un)Fairness
We also consider a model in which the fairness reference point is constant at the equal split
norm—r = 1/N in an N -player game, independent of past experiences—but the fairness
sensitivity parameters β and α vary. We analogously define
β(µ¯τi , ν¯
τ
i ) = (1− γPE − γOE)(β0) + γPE
τ−1∑
t=1
µt −m
τ − 1 + γOE
τ−1∑
t=1
νt − n
τ − 1 (6)
= β1 + γPE
τ−1∑
t=1
µτ
τ − 1 + γOE
τ−1∑
t=1
νt
τ − 1 (7)
α(µ¯τi , ν¯
τ
i ) = (1− γPE − γOE)(α0) + γPE
τ−1∑
t=1
µt −m
τ − 1 + γOE
τ−1∑
t=1
νt − n
τ − 1 (8)
= α1 + γPE
τ−1∑
t=1
µτ
τ − 1 + γOE
τ−1∑
t=1
νt
τ − 1 (9)
where β1 := (1−γPE−γOE)(β0)−γPEm−γOEn, α1 := (1−γPE−γOE)(α0)−γPEm−γOEn,
and m and n are normalizing constants determining whether a particular observation or
payoff experience increases or decreases the sensitivity to un(fairness). Our linear models for
β and α thus involve constant terms β1 and α1, as well as the slope parameters γPE and γOE
that determine how changes in experience affect α and β. Although we cannot unpack the
constant terms to separately identify α0 and β0 from m and n, our main interest is in γPE
and γOE—how differences in observational and personal payoff experiences affect fairness
sensitivity parameters.
We stress that our modeling of sensitivity to (un)fairness may not correspond perfectly
to the true structural model, at least when interpreted literally. We show in Appendix
C, however, that the salience model of Bordalo et al. (2012; 2013; 2015) generates fairness
sensitivity weights that are monotonic in observed offers and experienced payoff shares. In the
salience model, γPE and γOE correspond to the salience parameter multiplied by the fractions
of consumers whose evoked sets contain individual payoff experience and observational payoff
experience, respectively.
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3.4.3 Estimation
As before, we use method of moments techniques to exploit purely exogenous variation
created by random assignment to different treatments, and avoid potentially endogenous
differences in MAOs in phase 1 and phase 2. We use equation (1) to compute a responder’s
predicted MAO, given the predicted values of α, β, and r. The six different treatment cells
(see table 4) allow us to use Generalized Method of Moments to recover γPE and γOE in
equation (4) or in equation (6). The six moment conditions we obtain from the six different
treatment cells are
E
[(
MAO − 300βr
2βr + β + 1
)
Tj
]
= 0
where the Tj are dummies corresponding to the six possible treatment conditions. Letting
ξ = (β0, γPE, γOE) denote the parameters, the GMM estimator chooses the parameters ξˆ
that minimize (m(ξ)−mˆ)′W (m(ξ)−mˆ), where m(ξ) are the theoretical moments, mˆ are the
empirical moments, and W is the weighting matrix for the six moment conditions. The most
efficient choice of W is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix, which we approximate
using an iterative estimation procedure as specified in Hall (2005). As always, we compute
robust standard errors clustered at the phase 1 market matching group level. We use the
Gauss-Newton algorithm to implement the minimum distance estimator.
A key difference from the empirical analysis in the rest of the paper is that because
the fully specified model states that either the reference point r or the behindness aversion
parameter β is shaped by all previous experience and observation, estimating our model on
all 15 periods of phase 2 requires us to use data from phase 2 experiences and observations
when formulating (4). Thus the past experience variables we construct use the average
of all past experiences, including past experience from previous periods in phase 2. This
is somewhat problematic because in phase 2, personal payoff experience and observational
experience are highly collinear, as they are in experiment 1.34 Thus when estimating our
model on all 15 periods of phase 2, our only source of exogenous variation for separating
between personal payoff experience and observational experience is still phase 1 experience.
Because of the high degree of collinearity in phase 2, we are thus cautious about interpreting
the estimates that arise from using all 15 periods of phase 2 data.
Table 7 presents the results, with columns (1) and (3) focusing on period 1 only, and
columns (2) and (4) using data from all 15 periods. For the reasons mentioned above,
34A related issue is that there is not a lot of exogenous variation in experience in phase 2. Most of the
exogenous variation in phase 2 experience would have to come from exogenous variation in proposer offers,
which comes from exogenous variation in proposers’ experience. In section 3.5 we confirm that the exogenous
variation in proposers’ phase 1 experience does, indeed, impact their offers, at least initially.
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates for the impact of personal payoff and observational experience
in the fairness model
Impact of γPE and γOE on Impact of γPE and γOE on
the reference point r the fairness sensitivity parameter β
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γPE 0.13** 0.04 0.37** 0.10
(0.06) (0.09) (0.18) (0.22)
γOE 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.97*** 0.81***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.28) (0.24)
λ 0.98*** 0.78***
(0.09) (0.08)
Constant 0.31*** 0.32***
(0.08) (0.06)
Adj. R2
Observations 222 3330 222 3330
Hansen’s J 1.65 0.30 1.16 0.20
(p=0.65) (p=0.96) (p=0.76) (p=0.98)
Observations 222 3330 222 3330
Generalized Method of Moments estimates of the impact of observational and personal payoff experience on
fairness reference points r and the sensitivity to unfairness β, using equations 1, 4 and 6. Columns (1) and (3)
use period 1 data only, while columns (2) and (4) use data from all 15 periods. The six moment conditions
are determined by instruments corresponding to the six Experiment × Treatment conditions. Standard
errors are clustered at the phase 1 market matching group level. The weighting matrix for the minimum
distance estimator is computed iteratively to approximate the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix. The
minimum distance estimation is implemented via the Gauss-Newton algorithm. Hansen’s overidentification
test reports the likelihood that the our specified model is consistent with the data. Significance levels:
∗∗∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5% and ∗ = 10%.
the period 1 only data uses cleaner exogenous variation for estimating our three structural
parameters. Column (1) shows that both personal payoff experience and observational expe-
rience receive positive weight in shaping the reference point when α and β are assumed to not
be affected by phase 1 experiences. While both weights are significantly different from 0, the
weight given to observational experience, 0.325, is roughly 2.5 times larger than the weight
given to personal payoff experience, and this difference in weights is significant (p = 0.07).
When estimating parameters using all data in column (2), the estimates look similar, with
only γPE losing significance, potentially because of the partial collinearity problem.
Similarly, column (3) shows that when we assume that r is fixed exogenously at 0.5,
personal payoff experience and observational experience both have a positive and significant
impact on the sensitivity to unfairness β. Again, the relative impact of observational ex-
perience is roughly 2.6 times higher than the impact of personal payoff experience. This
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difference, however, fails to be statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.11).
When estimating the relative impact using all data in column (4), the coefficient on ob-
servational experience remains largely unchanged, while the coefficient on payoff experience
becomes smaller and looses significance.
3.5 Proposer Offers
Last, we turn to proposer behavior, which should be influenced both by their own fairness
motive as well as by responders’ MAOs. To analyze the extent to which proposers’ own
fairness motives are path-dependent, we construct for each proposer his average personal
payoff experience and observational experience from phase 1, and analyze how that influences
his subsequent offer strategy. To analyze how proposers adjust their strategies to responder
behavior, we use phase 1 exogenous variation in responders’ experience: for each matching
group we construct variables for the average phase 1 payoff experience and observational
experience of all responders in the matching group. Table 8 displays regressions analyzing
how proposers’ and responders’ phase 1 experience and observation influence proposers’
phase 2 offers. To construct instruments for the 4 experience and observation variables we
now use both variation in responder phase 1 conditions and in proposer phase 2 conditions.
Because RC responders can be matched to either RC proposers or PC proposers (while PC
responders are always matched to PC proposers), this gives us 3 different matching groups
for each of the three experiments, for a total of 3× 3 = 9 instruments. We use the iterative
GMM estimator as before.
Consistent with the path-dependent fairness hypothesis, column (1) shows that in period
1, the estimated coefficient on personal payoff experience is negative and relatively large
in magnitude, implying that proposers who are used to receiving a higher share of the
surplus feel entitled to a greater share and thus are less likely to make a generous offer
to responders. At the same time, the coefficient on observational experience is positive,
implying that proposers who are used to observing higher offers are more likely to make a
high offer. 35
Column (2) of the table, on the other hand, uses data from all 15 periods of phase 2.
Over all 15 periods, proposers’ offers are very sensitive to responders’ experiences: The
higher the payoff experience or observed offers of the responders, the higher the offers made
by the proposers to these responders. In fact, the responder experience and observation
coefficients in column (2) of Table 8 are almost identical to the responder experience and
35As would be expected, the regression coefficients on average responder observational and payoff experi-
ence are insignificant. Because proposers were not aware of responders’ history, there is no reason as to why
proposers should react to responders’ histories.
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Table 8: The impact of observational and personal payoff experience on proposer offers
(1) (2)
Offers Offers
Observational experience 8.58* 7.58
(4.50) (4.86)
Personal payoff experience –13.18*** 5.88
(2.59) (3.69)
Avg. responder observational experience 5.94 15.98***
(4.62) (3.80)
Avg. responder personal payoff experience –5.14 8.56**
(4.43) (3.40)
Constant 46.36*** 39.36***
(2.78) (3.16)
Adj. R2 0.02 0.11
Observations 222 3330
Instrumental variables regressions of offers on proposer and responder personal payoff experience and ob-
servational experience, using data from all three experiments. Both proposer and responder personal payoff
experience and observational experience are instrumented using 9 dummies, one for each phase 2 matching
group in each experiment. All estimates computed using the iterative GMM estimator. Columns (1) con-
tains observations from period 1 of phase 2 only. Column (2) contains all observations. Standard errors are
clustered at the phase 1 market matching group (2 clusters per session, 30 clusters in total). Significance
levels: ∗∗∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5% and ∗ = 10%.
observation coefficients in column (6) of Table 6, suggesting that proposers’ offers respond
almost one-for-one to responders’ MAO’s. The mechanism for this stark result is clear:
proposers quickly learn what offers the responders find acceptable, and thus react quickly
to match their behavior to that of responders. That proposers behave in a seemingly profit-
maximizing manner here is not surprising, as they are less concerned with fairness under the
model’s assumption that α < β.
4 Discussion
In this section we discuss what theories can and cannot explain our results. We suggest that
“simple anchoring,” commonly studied learning dynamics, and consumption-based models
of dynamically-adjusting reference points are unlikely drivers of our results. We suggest that
other theories such as backwards-looking fairness reference points or salience theory are more
likely to be driving our results.
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4.1 Reference Dependence
Backwards-looking Fairness Reference Points
One explanation of our results is a literal interpretation of our model of experience-based
fairness reference points, formalized in Sections 2.2 and 3.4. This formulation follows Ben-
jamin (2015), who proposes a variant of such a model and uses it to explain a number of
puzzles in labor markets.
Expectations-based Fairness Reference Points
An alternative model, in the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), is that the reference point
is based on expectations.36 A responder may choose to reject a proposer’s offer when that
offer falls far short of what the responder expected to receive.
A model with rational expectations as reference points, however, would not be consistent
with our main results. Once players learn which game they will be participating in for the
subsequent 15 periods, their rational expectations about outcomes should not depend on
their phase 1 experiences and observations.37
Consequently, such a modification of our model would need to be combined with a model
of naive, rather than rational expectations in order to explain any path-dependence in re-
sponders’ phase 2 behavior. Adaptive expectations, combined with a theory of preferences
in which responders like to reject offers that are below what they expected, could partly
explain the impact of observational experience.38 We leave it to future work to decompose
36In the context of third-party punishment, Coffman (2010) tests the idea that third parties’ expectations
may shape their punishment decisions, but does not find evidence for this hypothesis. In the context of
risk preferences, Ericson et al. (2011); Heffetz and List (2014) and Camerer et al. (2016) provide (mixed)
evidence that expectations shape reference points, which is also demonstrated by Abeler et al. (2011) and
Camerer et al. (2016) in the context of effort provision.
37Rational expectations should only be shaped by knowledge of the game structure, and beliefs about
other players’ types. And since rational players should not have their beliefs systematically biased by play in
different games, these rational players should not have different beliefs about each others’ types as a result of
playing different games in phase 1. Of course, it may be possible to accommodate our results with a model in
which there are multiple rational expectations equilibria and past experience serves as a coordination device
for selecting an equilibrium. However, we do not find such an explanation particularly satisfactory, since it
amounts to assuming a model with enough degrees of freedom in its predictions such that our data can’t
falsify it. A more satisfactory account would have our empirical results as a prediction.
38See Cooper and Dutcher (2011) for a sketch of a model based on belief-based reciprocity models (Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). As we show in appendix B, however, such models
do not naturally give rise to this effect. It is also interesting to note that such adaptive expectations should
only be based on available information about other players’ behavior, which is captured by our observational
experience variable. To explore this further, table 13 in Appendix H analyzes only the Full Information
experiment, where all players receive the same information about phase 1 behavior. The table shows that
the payoff differences generated by phase 1 market assignment still have a significant impact on behavior
in this experiment. Consequently, further assumptions on the formation of naive expectations would need
to be imposed to also explain the effect of personal payoff experience, such as overweighting of personally
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how much of our observational experience effect is driven by backward-looking expectations.
Other Forms of Reference-dependent Preferences
Reference-dependent preferences have traditionally been discussed in the literature in the
context of risky choice (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and have subsequently been applied
to other domains of decision making, such as consumption (Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)). In
these models, actual consumption, or monetary gains and losses, are evaluated relative to
the reference point, and deviations of outcomes from this reference point are then associated
with psychological gain/loss utility. In contrast, we posit that people’s fairness preferences,
and not just consumption utility, is reference dependent. To what extent do these approaches
differ? In Appendix B we show that models in which reference dependence affects only one’s
utility from earnings, rather than perceptions of fairness, predict the opposite of our results
in the Baseline experiment. Intuitively, the higher the payoffs in phase 1 of the experiment,
the higher the reference point in phase 2, and thus the more painful it is to reject an offer
and get a zero payoff.
4.2 Salience theory
Salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012, 2013, 2015) provides one possible microfoundation
for how the α and β parameters in our simple model might depend on past experience.
We explore this in detail in Appendix C. We show that fairness will be more salient than
own payoffs for responders who have previously observed and experienced high offers; and
conversely for responders who have previously observed and experienced lower offers. We use
a mixture model—in which some subjects’ “evoked sets” include observational experience
and other subjects’ evoked sets include payoff experience—to rationalize the differential
impact of payoff vs. observational experience on aggregate behavior.
The key feature of salience theory that makes it applicable to our results is that it
delineates an important role for the effect of past experience in shaping salience weights.
Other theories of context effects such as those of Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et
al. (2015), could not explain our results, as these theories assume that the focusing/attention
weights are shaped solely by the decision-maker’s current choice set. Our empirical results
about observational vs. personal payoff experience provide some new guidance on which
elements of people’s histories are most likely to be part of their evoked sets.
experienced outcomes. Evidence that expectations may interact with fairness in other contexts is provided
by Gilchrist et al. (2016), who find that unexpected bonuses promote more worker reciprocity than expected
wage increases.
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4.3 “Simple Anchoring”
Experimental evidence has shown that individuals can be influenced by arbitrary anchors
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Ariely et al., 2003; Simonson
and Tversky, 1992), and in a certain sense, the path-dependence effects that we identify
could be related to anchoring. However, we are able to rule out a broad set of possible types
of anchoring that we refer to as “simple anchoring.” We call “simple anchoring” the idea
that a subject’s choice of action (e.g., offer) starts at some anchor, and then is incompletely
adjusted toward the optimal choice of action. Formally, the choice of action is given by
a = (1 − κ)ϑ + κa∗ where ϑ is the anchor, a∗ is the optimal action, and κ ∈ [0, 1] is the
degree of adjustment away from the anchor.39
Before moving on to a more thorough analysis, we first note that only the impact of ob-
servational experience can possibly be explained by simple anchoring, similar to the findings
by Ariely et al. (2003). Observational experience captures all observational attributes of
phase 1, such as high and low offers, that could serve as arbitrary anchors. The significant
effect of personal payoff experience cannot be explained by such simple anchoring. A second
immediate argument against such simple forms of anchoring is the change in strategy space
between phase 1 (accept/reject) and phase 2 (MAO), which further limits the applicability
of “simple anchoring”.
To further distinguish simple anchoring from other theories, in Appendix A we show
theoretically that differences in preferences will lead to differences in behavior in environ-
ments such as the Ultimatum Game, but that they will not lead to differences in behavior in
competitive market games as in phase 1 of our experiment (see Appendix A). In contrast,
simple anchoring predicts that there there should be differences in behavior in both phase
2 and phase 1. Building on this, in Appendix G we provide evidence that observational
experience is also unlikely to be the consequence of simple anchoring. We do this using the
Full Information experiment, in which all subjects received feedback about the average offers
in both the PC and the RC markets after every period during phase 1 of the experiment.
Thus subjects in the PC market observe a potential anchor that is substantially lower than
offers in the PC market, whereas subjects in the RC market observe a potential anchor that
is substantially higher than offers in the RC markets. As we have already demonstrated,
such observational experience has large effects on behavior in phase 2. But if subjects’ be-
havior were indeed driven by simple anchoring, then responders in the RC market in the
Full Information experiment should show higher acceptance rates than responders in the RC
39For example, Ariely et al. (2003) have shown that the provision of arbitrary anchors, such as the final
two digits of one’s social security number, affect an individual’s willingness to pay.
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market in the Baseline or in the Role Switch experiments.40 Similarly, PC Proposers in the
Full Information experiment should offer less than PC Proposers in the other two experi-
ments, and RC proposers in the Full Information experiment offer more than RC proposers
in the other two experiments. Contrary to this, both proposers and responders in the Full
Information experiment behave identically to the proposers and responders in the Baseline
and the Role Switch experiments.
4.4 Reinforcement Learning
Roth and Erev (1995)41 have applied the reinforcement learning (RL) model to ultimatum
game dynamics. There are several aspects of our data that are inconsistent with reinforce-
ment learning models. Plainly, our results about the effects of observational experience are
inconsistent with RL, as RL is based only on experience, rather than observation. Relatedly,
applying the RL model to our experiments is importantly limited by the fact that the strat-
egy spaces change significantly between phases 1 and 2 in each of our experiments.42 The
RL model is a model that is applied to learning over time with a fixed strategy space.43
4.5 Reciprocity vs. Distributional Preferences
Literally interpreted, our intentionally simple theoretical framework is a model of path-
dependent distributional preferences. Alternatively, we could base our analysis on the Char-
ness and Rabin (2002) model, in which responders want to punish proposers who don’t take
“nice” actions. The corresponding generalization of this model would similarly posit that
past experience could either modify the reference point for what is considered “nice,” or it
could modify responders’ sensitivity to not being treated nicely. Our model could be inter-
preted as a reduced-form manifestation of this kind of framework, where r is the fairness
reference point and β is the strength of (negative) reciprocity. We cannot distinguish between
distributional preferences and reciprocity preferences in our data, and we leave it for future
work to determine whether past experiences shape distributional preferences, reciprocity
40We restrict attention to the RC market because in the PC market, responders almost never reject both
offers, and hence there is not enough variance in the data to identify a potential impact.
41See also Grosskopf (2003)
42In the Baseline and Full Information experiments, the strategy space is {Accept, Reject} in Phase 1,
while in Phase 2 the strategy space is {0, 5, . . . , 100}. Perhaps even more problematic is the Role Switch
experiment, in which a subject is chooses between offers in Phase 1, but chooses MAOs in Phase 2.
43Our result that proposers quickly adjust their offers to match the behavior of responders is consistent
with RL. However, it is also explained by our preference-based model, which specifies that β > α; e.g., that
subjects care more about being behind than being ahead. Indeed, we show in Appendix C that if α = 0 then
proposers would essentially behave as pure profit-maximizers and thus their behavior would only be affected
by responder experience.
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preferences, or both.
5 Conclusion
While most work on social preferences has progressed under the presumption of static pref-
erences, we show that fairness preferences are malleable and shaped by economic forces that
lead to the experience of different types of market outcomes. We also show that such mal-
leability can be captured by simple, tractable, and estimable models. Our reduced-form
and structural results imply significant deviations from existing models of fairness. Our
results therefore highlight the importance of considering contrast effects in the domain of
fairness. In addition to the labor market implications explored by Benjamin (2015) and
others, our evidence of path dependence also has implications for various settings studied
in industrial organization. Our results imply that a tradeoff exists between the immediate
loss of customers who judge a certain transaction to be unfair, and the long run profits
generated through an increased willingness to pay of customers once the fairness preferences
have adjusted. This leads to new considerations for dynamic price-setting.
Our results on observational experience also generate practical implications for price dis-
crimination. A firm trying to price discriminate among consumers should try to conceal
this price discrimination from consumers being offered the highest price, but inform those
consumers receiving low prices. When such differential information provision is not feasible,
the formal models we have introduced could be used to analyze when shrouding price dis-
crimination is payoff maximizing. With the rise of the potential for personalized pricing and
advertising in e-commerce, such considerations become increasingly important.
More generally, a key implication of our results on observational experience is that in-
forming buyers (workers) about other prices (wages) should change the prices (wages) that
are perceived as acceptable, even when such information is payoff irrelevant. Consequently,
increased information dispersion should have the effect of homogenizing fairness norms.
A number of questions about mechanisms remain unanswered. For example, further work
is needed to precisely identify which theories explain the path-dependence that we identify.
Our experimental results also don’t shed light on the precise nature of how past experiences
are coded: Do more recent experiences receive more weight? Are past offers that are below,
rather than above, what one is used to particularly salient? These and other theoretical and
empirical extensions of our analysis are directions for future research.
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Appendix
A Results for Market Games
In this appendix we consider predictions for the PC and RC market games. Proposers’ pref-
erences (βP , rP ) are drawn from some distribution FP and responders’ preferences (βR, rR)
are drawn from some distribution FR. The solution concept we consider is a pure strategy
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
1. There is a unique PBE in the PC market game: both proposers offer 100 chips, and the
responder randomly chooses one of the offers.
Proof. [sketch] Let a be Proposer 1’s offer, and suppose that a < 100. Clearly, it is never
strictly optimal for Proposer 2 to offer anything less than a. It is also not optimal to offer a.
By choosing a +  instead of a, the proposer increases his chance of winning from 1/2 to 1.
The net impact on utility is is (100− a− )− (100− a)/2 > 0 for  sufficiently small. Thus,
it is not possible to have a < 1 in equilibrium.
2. The following is a PBE of the RC market game: the proposer offers 0 chips and the
responders accept with probability 1.
Proof. [sketch] First, we show that the Proposer offering 0 and the responders accepting all
offers is an equilibrium. Since α < 1, it is always optimal for a proposer to offer nothing
if that offer will be accepted with probability 1. Next consider a responder’s best response
function in this proposed equilibrium. Note that by deviating and choosing to reject the
offer, the responder cannot decrease the size of the pie. Since the other responder will
accept, the final outcome after the deviation will still be the proposer getting 100 chips and
the responders getting nothing. Thus there is no incentive to deviate.
B Appendix to Section 4
B.1 Reference dependence over monetary payoffs
Here we consider a model in which preferences are reference-dependent with respect to
monetary payoffs, but the fairness preferences are fixed. Let a responders’ preferences be
given by u(piR,piP |r) = piR + µ(piR − r) + f(piR,piP ) where r is the reference point, µ is the
gain-loss utility, and f is the fairness utility. Let µ and f be continuous and assume that
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u(piR, 300 − 3piR|r) is strictly increasing in piR for each r. This guarantees that for each
value of r, there is a minimally acceptable offer MAO(r). Finally, we make the standard
assumption that µ is concave.44
3. MAO(r) is decreasing in r.
The intuition for the Proposition is simple: the higher the reference point r, the more
painful it is to get a payoff of 0, and thus the lower the MAO. Formally, µ(piR− r)−µ(0− r)
is decreasing in r because of the concavity of µ.
Now the natural assumption to make about how experience shapes the reference point
is that experiencing higher offers or payoffs should lead to a higher reference point r. This
is the case in theories of backwards-looking reference points, as in Bowman et al. (1999).
Alternatively, if r is shaped by expectations which are based on the types of offers observed,
then r should again be increasing in history of offers. Thus in experiment 1, r should be higher
for responders in the PC market than for responders in the RC market. The Proposition
thus implies that PC responders should actually have lower MAO’s than RC responders -
the opposite of our experimental results. This implies that unless fairness preferences are
themselves shaped by past experience, there is no natural model of reference-dependence
over monetary payoffs that is consistent with our experimental results.
B.2 Belief-based reciprocity models
We now argue that belief-based reciprocity models do not offer a natural explanation of our
results. First, consider Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004) extension of Rabin’s (1993)
intention based reciprocity model. For the proposer, [0, 100] is the efficient set of offers a,
and thus the “equitable” benchmark is given by aep = 50. If the proposer believes that a
responder accepts his offer of a with probability θ, then his kindness toward this responder
is thus θa− 50.
For the responder, the set of efficient strategies conditional on an offer a is simply to
accept; thus the “equitable” payoff to the proposer conditional on an offer a is simply a. Thus
if a responder rejects a proposer’s offer, his kindness toward the proposer is −a. Letting φ
denote the strength of the reciprocity motive, the responder’s payoff from choosing an MAO
is given by
ˆ
x
[a− φa(50− aθ˜]1x≥MdF˜ (x) (10)
44Note that our assumptions on µ are more general than those of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
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where F˜ are the responder’s beliefs about the strategy of the proposer, and θ˜ is the probability
that the proposer thinks his offer will be accepted (from the responder’s perspective; i.e., it
is the responder’s second order belief). Thus the MAO is given simply as the value M for
which M − φM(50−Mθ˜) = 0. The key feature of this condition is that M does not depend
on the responder’s expectation of proposer behavior. Thus this model, combined with a
reasonable theory of adaptively formed expectations, would still not explain our results.
Similarly, in Falk and Fischbacher’s (2006) model, a straightforward extension of (19) in
their Appendix 3, shows that U2A − U2R, the relative gain from accepting versus rejecting
an offer a, is given by
U2A − U2R = a+ φθ˜(300− 3a− a)(100− a) (11)
Again, this shows that the acceptance decision does not depend on beliefs F˜ .
It is possible that past experiences might shape the second order belief θ˜. However, there
are no models of learning that posit how past experiences shape second-order beliefs, and
there isn’t a clear hypothesis about how our phase 1 experiences should shape it. Moreover,
intention based reciprocity models do not make a robust prediction about how θ˜ affects M .
In Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), M is decreasing in θ˜ while in Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) M is increasing in θ˜ (note that the utility from accepting is decreasing in θ˜ in equation
(11) while it is increasing in equation (10)).
C Salience Theory
C.1 Set up
The true utility function is Ui = Π [µi − βmax(r − µi, 0)− αmax(µi − r, 0)], where µi =
pii/Π is player i’s share of the pie, and r = 1/N is the fairness norm in an N -player game.
How a responder trades off payoffs and fairness, however, depends on which is more
salient. We let ∆i := µi− r denote how much the responder’s share of the pie deviates from
the fairness norm, and we let (µi,∆i) denote the pair consisting of the responder’s payoff
and the fairness deviation. The salience of payoffs versus fairness deviations depends on how
those attributes depart from payoff and fairness values in the responder’s evoked set. The
evoked set E includes 1) the option corresponding to the proposer’s offer, (µ(ai),∆(ai)), where
µ(ai) =
ai
3(100−ai)+ai =
ai
300−2ai and ∆(ai) :=
ai
3(100−ai)+ai − r = ai300−2ai − r. It includes 2) the
option corresponding to the responder rejecting, (0, 0). And it includes 3) a historical average
of payoffs and fairness values either experienced or observed by the responder, (µHi ,∆
H
i ). We
discuss the construction of the historical averages later.
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Given the evoked set E , the salience is determined by comparison to the reference good
(µ¯, ∆¯) given byµ¯ =
µi+0+µ
H
i
3
and ∆¯ = ∆(µi)+0+∆
H
3
. The salience of a payoff pii is given by
σ(µi, µ¯) and the salience of a fairness deviation ∆i is given by σ(∆i, ∆¯). As in BGS, we
assume that the salience function σ(·, ·) satisfies
1. Scale invariance. σ(αx, αy) = σ(x, y)
2. Diminishing sensitivity. If x ≥ 0, then for any  > 0, σ(x+ , y+ ) ≤ σ(x, y), with the
inequality strict if y > 0.
3. Reflection. σ(x, y) = σ(−x,−y).
A salience function that satisfies these properties for x, y 6= 0 is σ(x, y) = |x−y||x|+|y| . Note that
the maximum value of this salience function is 1, and that σ(x, 0) = σ(0, y) = 1 for x, y 6= 0.
To define σ(0, 0), we thus make the more general fourth assumption that σ(0, y) = σ(x, 0) = 1
for all x, y.
As in BGS, the responder evaluates the option (µi,∆i) as follows:
U si =

Π [µi − δ (βmax(r − µi, 0) + αmax(µi − r, 0))] if σ(µi, µ¯) > σ(∆i, ∆¯)
Π [µi − (βmax(r − µi, 0) + αmax(µi − r, 0))] if σ(µi, µ¯) = σ(∆i, ∆¯)
Π [δµi − (βmax(r − µi, 0) + αmax(µi − r, 0))] if σ(µi, µ¯) < σ(∆i, ∆¯)
where δ ∈ (0, 1]. To ensure that the responder does not reject offers that give him more
than half of the pie, we make the reasonable assumption that α/δ < 2.
C.2 Explaining Experiment 1 results
The perceived utility of rejection is always 0. How does the responder evaluate the utility of
accepting the action? We first begin with the case in which (µHi ,∆
H
i ) ∈ {(0,−1/3), (1, 2/3)}.
These two cases correspond to the equilibrium outcomes in the PC and RC markets, respec-
tively.
Case 1. (µHi ,∆
H
i ) = (1, 2/3) In this case, µ¯ = (1 + µi)/3 and ∆¯ = ((µi − 1/2) + 2/3) /3.
Thus payoff salience is given by σ(µi, (1 + µi)/3) = σ(3µi, µi + 1), while fairness salience
is given by σ (µi − 1/2, (µi + 1/6)/3) = σ (3µi − 3/2, µi + 1/6). Now because the proposer
makes an offer that gives the responder a payoff smaller than his own, µi < 1/2, and thus
the combination of the scale invariance and diminishing sensitivity assumptions implies that
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fairness is always more salient than payoffs in this case. The smallest share µi a responder
is willing to accept in this case must satisfy
δµi − β(1/2− µi) = 0
and thus µi =
β
2(β+δ)
. Since µi =
ai
300−2ai by definition, this shows that smallest offer a
responder is willing to accept in this case is thus M = 150β
δ+2β
.
Case 2. (µHi ,∆i) = (0,−1/3) In this case, µ¯ = µi/3 and ∆¯ = (µi − 5/6) /3. Thus payoff
salience is given by σ(µi, µi/3) = σ(3, 1), while fairness salience is given by σ (µi − 1/2, (µi − 5/6)/3) =
σ (3µi − 3/2, µi − 5/6). Now because the proposer makes an offer that gives the responder a
payoff smaller than his own, µi < 1/2 and thus ∆i and ∆¯ are negative. In this case, payoffs
will be more salient than payoffs if and only if µi−5/6
µi−3/2 < 3, which happens when µi < 11/24.
When payoffs are salient, the smallest acceptable share is the solution to
µi − δβ(1/2− µi) = 0
and thus is µi =
δβ
2(1+δβ)
. Now since µi =
ai
300−2ai , the smallest offer that a responder is willing
to accept in this case is M1 =
150δβ
1+2δβ
. When fairness is salient, the smallest acceptable offer
is given by M2 =
150β
δ+2β
as before. Because M1 < M2, it follows that the proposers will offer
M1 iff
δβ
2(1+δβ)
¡11/24 or, equivalently, iff δβ < 11. If, however, δβ ≥ 11 then proposers offer
M2. Note, however, that δβ < 11 is a very general condition that is extremely unlikely to be
violated. In the standard ultimatum game without salience considerations, a β > 11 would
imply that responders reject all offers that give them less than 42.3% of the total pie.
Proposition 1. Suppose that δβ¡11. Then MAORC =
(
δ2+2δβ
1+2δβ
)
MAOPC < MAOPC.
C.3 The Mixture Model and the Role Switch and Full Information
experiments
Is it observational experience or personal payoff experience that enters into the evoked set E
as (µH ,∆H)? While this does not affect our experiment 1 interpretation, since the two are
essentially identical, this can affect behavior in the Role Switch and the Full Information
experiments. We suppose that a fraction q relies on observational experience, and a fraction
1−q relies on personal payoff experience. Out of those who rely on observational experience,
we suppose that in the Full Information Experiment, a fraction ω relies on what they observe
in their own market, while a fraction (1−ω) rely on what they observe in the other market.
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In this mixture model of the evoked set, the distribution of the option (µH ,∆H) in the evoked
set is thus as follows:
• For responders who were responders in the PC market and observed only that market,
(µH ,∆H) = (1, 2/3) with probability 1.
• For responders who were responders in the RC market and observed only that market,
(µH ,∆H) = (0,−1/3) with probability 1.
• For responders who were proposers in the PC market, (µH ,∆H) = (1, 2/3) with prob-
ability q and (µH ,∆H) = (0,−1/3) with probability 1− q.
• For responders who were proposers in the RC market, (µH ,∆H) = (1, 2/3) with prob-
ability 1− q and (µH ,∆H) = (0,−1/3) with probability q.
• For responders who were in the PC market but observed both markets, (µH ,∆H) =
(1, 2/3) with probability 1−q+qω and (µH ,∆H) = (0,−1/3) with probability q(1−ω).
• For responders who were in the RC market but observed both markets, (µH ,∆H) =
(0,−1/3) with probability 1−q+qω and (µH ,∆H) = (1, 2/3) with probability q(1−ω).
We now have the following result:
4. Suppose thatδβ < 11. Define Mh =
150β
δ+2β
andMl = δ¯2Ml, where δ¯2 :=
δ2+2δβ
1+2δβ
< 1. Then
1. For responders who were responders in the PC market and observed only that market,
the average MAO is Mh
2. For responders who were responders in the RC market and observed only that market,
the average MAO is Ml = δ¯
2Mh
3. For responders who were proposers in the PC market, the average MAO is qMh + (1−
q)Ml = Mh
[
q + (1− q)δ¯2]
4. For responders who were proposers in the RC market, the average MAO is (1−q)Mh+
qMl = Mh
[
1− q + qδ¯2]
5. For responders who were in the PC market but observed both markets, the average
MAO is (1− q + qω)Mh + q(1− ω)Ml = Mh
[
1− q + qω + qδ¯2 − qωδ¯2]
6. For responders who were in the RC market but observed both markets, the average
MAO is (1− q + qω)Ml + q(1− ω)Mh = Mh
[
q − qω + δ¯2 − qδ¯2 + qωδ¯2].
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D Convergence results
In this appendix, we show that if players enter the same environment with different experi-
ences, then preferences will eventually converge. We make several simplifications: we assume
that α = 0, and we assume that the effect of past experience is solely through the reference
point . We consider play in periods t = −T, . . . , 0, 1, 2, . . .∞. In periods t = −T, . . . , 0, play-
ers participate in some n player game (possibly one of the market games), while in periods
t = 1, 2, . . . players participate in a non-competitive ultimatum game. As in section 3.3, we
let µti denote the share of the pie that player i received in period t, and set µ
t
i = 0 if all n
players received zero payoffs in the respective period. We assume that the proposer’s payoff
in periods t > 1 is given by k(Y − a), while the responder’s payoff is given by a, where a is
the offer.
In period t = −T , player i’s reference point in an n person game is given by µ−Ti = 1/n.
In periods t > −T , the reference point of player i in an n-player game is given by
rti = (1− γ)(1/2) + γ
∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
i∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
.
where w0, w1, . . . ... is an infinite sequence given by w0 = 1 and wj = δ
j for some δ ∈ [0, 1]
In the simple specification adopted here, the reference point is a convex combination of the
“neutral reference point” 1/n and the weighted average of past personal payoff experience.
Augmenting the specification to allow for observational experience would not change our
results.
We consider the evolution of play between a proposer and a responder in periods t > 0.
We let rtP and r
t
R denote the proposer’s and responder’s period t > 0 reference points. We
assume that each period, proposers and responders have perfect information about each
others’ reference points, and play an SPE of the non-competitive ultimatum game. We let
M t denote the minimal acceptable offer of a responder i in period t > 0, and let at denote
the proposer’s period t > 0 offer.
Throughout this analysis, we will be concerned with steady state preferences and strate-
gies:
1. A steady state is a pair of strategies (a∗,M∗) and reference points (r∗P , r
∗
R) such that
1. (a∗,M∗) is an SPE of the ultimatum game in which players have the fairness reference
points (r∗P , r
∗
R)
2. r∗P = (1− γ)(1/2) + γ pi
∗
P
pi∗P+pi
∗
R
and r∗R = (1− γ)(1/2) + γ pi
∗
R
pi∗P+pi
∗
R
, where pi∗P and pi
∗
R are the
proposer’s and responder’s steady state SPE payoffs
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Our first result in this section is that there is a unique steady state to which play always
converges:
5. Assume that γ < 1. Then there is a unique steady state 〈(a∗,M∗), (r∗P , r∗R)〉. In the steady
state, a∗ > 0, a∗ < k(Y − a∗), and a∗ = M∗. Moreover, this steady state is globally stable.
That is, for any set of initial experiences {µti}0t=−T , preferences and strategies converge to
the steady state:
lim
t→∞
rtP = r
∗
P and lim
t→∞
rtR = r
∗
R
lim
t→∞
at = a∗ and lim
t→∞
M t = M∗
Proposition 5 shows that if players have enough experience in the ultimatum game en-
vironment, then their fairness preferences in that environment can be characterized as a
fixed point of an adjustment dynamic. In fact, Proposition 5 shows that our model uniquely
pins down what the steady-state fairness preferences can be—the steady state is unique.
The only assumption needed to guarantee uniqueness is that γ < 1: that is, that players’
fairness preferences are not completely (though perhaps arbitrarily close to) determined by
past experience.
A second prediction of the model is that when players have extreme past experiences
as in our market conditions, convergence to the steady state will be monotonic. That is,
PC responders should monotonically decrease their MAO’s, while RC responders should
monotonically increase their MAO’s:
6. Assume that γ < 1 and that
∑0
t=−T µ
t
R
T+1
+
∑0
t=−T µ
t
P
T+1
≤ 1.
If
∑0
t=−T µ
t
R
T+1
< r∗R, then for all t > 0, M
t < r∗R but is strictly increasing in t.
If
∑0
t=−T µ
t
R
T+1
> r∗R, then for all t > 0, M
t > r∗R but is strictly decreasing in t.
Proposition 6 simply says that even though responders’ MAO’s should not reach steady
state levels in a finite number of periods, the effect of past market experience should still
diminish over time.
Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1: We first show that there is a unique steady state. In any steady state, we must have
M∗ − β[r∗R(k(Y −M∗) +M∗)−M∗] = 0, (12)
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which can be rearranged to show that
M∗
k(Y −M∗) +M∗ =
βr∗R
1 + β
. (13)
Offering a∗ = M∗ is clearly optimal for the proposer, conditional on making an offer that
the responder will accept. Moreover, since r∗P + r
∗
R = 1 by definition, some algebra shows
that
r∗P [k(Y −M∗) +M∗] < k(Y −M∗),
from which it follows that the proposer derives positive utility from making an offer a∗ = M∗.
Thus the proposer’s optimal strategy is to offer a∗ = M∗ in any steady state.
Plugging in a∗ = M∗ into (13), and using the definition of r∗R, we now have that
r∗R = (1− γ)(1/2) + γ
β
1 + β
r∗R. (14)
Equation (14) is a linear equation in r∗R with a unique solution given by
r∗R =
(1− γ) + β(1− γ)
2 + 2β(1− γ) . (15)
Thus there can be at most one steady state. We now show that the unique solution does,
indeed, correspond to a steady state. First, examination of equation (15) shows that r∗R ∈
(0, 1): since (1−γ) < 2, it is clear that the numerator is smaller than the denominator. Next,
by definition of M∗, accepting an offer of a∗ = M∗ is weakly optimal for the responder. And
as we have already established, offering a∗ = M∗ is also optimal for the proposer.
Step 2: We now show that for each  > 0, there exists a t ≥ 1 such that rtR + rtP ≤ 1 + .
To see this, notice that µtR + µ
t
P ≤ 1 for t ≥ 1, regardless of the outcome in period t. Thus
rtR + r
t
P = (1− γ) + γ
(∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
≤ (1− γ) + γ
(∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
+
∑t−1
τ=1wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
= 1 + γ
(∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
−
∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
But ∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
≤
∑0
τ=−T 2wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
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and ∑0
τ=−T wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
→ 0
as t→∞. Thus for each  > 0, there exists a t ≥ 1 such that rtR + rtP ≤ 1 + .
Step 3: We now show that there is some t† ≥ 1 such that at = M t for all t ≥ t†; that
is, for all t ≥ t†, the proposer derives positive utility from offering M t and having that offer
accepted.
Set rtP = 1−rtR+t. As in the proof of Proposition 5, we have that rtR[k(Y −M t)+M t] >
M t. Thus
rtP [k(Y −M t) +M t] = (1− rtR + t)[k(Y −M t) +M t]
< [k(Y −M t) +M t]−M t + t[k(Y −M t) +M t]
= k(Y −M t) + t[k(Y −M t) +M t].
This means that the proposer’s utility from offering M t is such that
utP ≥ k(Y −M t)− βmax(t, 0).
Moreover, because rtR ≤ (1− γ)/2 + γ = (1 + γ)/2, it easily follows that
M t =
kβrtRY
1 + β(1− rtR) + kβrtR
is bounded away from Y (for all possible β) as long as γ < 1. Thus we have that for all t,
there is some c > 0 such that k(Y −M t) ≥ c. By step 2, there is a t† such that βt < c for
all t ≥ t†. Thus there is a t† such that k(Y −M t)− βmax(t, 0) > 0 for all t ≥ t†.
Step 4: We now strengthen step 2 to show that |rtP + rtR − 1| → 0. By step 3, we now
have that µtR + µ
t
P = 1 for all t ≥ t†. Thus for t > t†,
rtR + r
t
P = (1− γ) + γ
(∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
= (1− γ) + γ
(∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
+
∑t−1
τ=t† wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
= 1 + γ
(∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
−
∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
)
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But since ∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
R + wt−1−τµ
τ
P∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
→ 0
and ∑t†−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
→ 0
as t→∞, it follows that rtR + rtP → 1 as t→∞.
Step 5: We now finish off the proof of the proposition by proving that the steady state
identified in Step 1 is globally stable.
Define νtR =
∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
i∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
. Define the map ξ : R→ R as follows:
ξ(ν) = (1− γ)/2 + γν.
Define the map ψ : R→ R as follows:
ψ(ν) =
βξ(ν)
1 + β
.
Notice that ψ is linear in ν and has slope γβ/(1 + β) < 1; thus ψ is a contraction and has a
unique fixed point. In a steady state, r∗R = ξ(ν
∗
R), and thus equation (13) implies that
M∗
k(Y −M∗) +M∗ = ψ(ν
∗
R). (16)
But since ν∗R =
M∗
k(Y−M∗)+M∗ by definition, it follows that the unique fixed point of ψ corre-
sponds to the unique steady state.
Now for t† defined as in step 3, rt = ξ(νt) and M
t
k(Y−Mt)+Mt = ψ(ν
t
R) for all t ≥ t†. Because
ξ is strictly increasing, each value of νtR corresponds to a unique value of M
t. Because ψ
is strictly increasing and because M
t
k(Y−Mt)+Mt is strictly increasing in r
t
R, each value of ν
t
R
also corresponds to a unique value of M t. Because ξ and ψ are both continuous functions
of ν, showing that νtR → ν∗R will thus imply that M t → M∗ and rtR → r∗R. Moreover, since
|rtR+rtP −1| → 0 by Step 4, convergence of rtR will also imply convergence of rtP . And finally,
since Step 3 shows that at = M t for all t ≥ t†, νtR → ν∗R will thus also imply that at → a∗.
Because ψ is an increasing and linear function of νt that crosses the 45-degree line exactly
once, it thus follows that ψ(ν) ∈ (ν∗, ν) for ν > ν∗ and ψ(ν) ∈ (ν, ν∗) for ν < ν∗. By
definition,
νt+1R =
w0∑t
τ=−T wt−τ
µtR +
(
1− w0∑t
τ=−T wt−τ
)
νtR (17)
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is a convex combination of νtR and ψ(ν
t
R) =
Mt
k(Y−Mt)+Mt = µ
t
R, which implies that ν
t+1
R ∈
(ν∗R, ν
t
R) if ν
t
R > ν
∗
R. Similarly, it follows that ν
t+1
R ∈ (νtR, ν∗R) if νtR < ν∗R.
For t† defined as in step 3, a simple induction thus implies that if νt
†
R < ν
∗
R, then ν
t
R will
be strictly increasing for t ≥ t† and bounded from above by ν∗. Similarly, if νt†R > ν∗, then νtR
will be strictly decreasing for t ≥ t† and bounded from below by ν∗R. Because any monotonic
and bounded sequence converges, νtR must converge to some ν
∗∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Because each value
of νtR corresponds to a unique value of M
t, and because ψ is continuous in ν, there must,
therefore, exist some M∗∗ such that M t →M∗∗. Thus
lim
t→∞
µtR = lim
t→∞
M t
k(Y −M t) +M t =
M∗∗
k(Y −M∗∗) +M∗∗ .
It is then easy to show that
νt =
∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τµ
τ
i∑t−1
τ=−T wt−1−τ
→ M
∗∗
k(Y −M∗∗) +M∗∗ .
On the other hand,
ψ(νtR) =
M t
k(Y −M t) +M t →
M∗∗
k(Y −M∗∗) +M∗∗ .
But since ψ is continuous, we therefore have that ψ(ν∗∗) = ν∗∗. And because ψ has a unique
fixed point, it must be that ν∗∗ = ν∗R, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6
Since rtP + r
t
R ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 1, the reasoning of Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 5 implies
that the proposer will offer at = M t in all periods t ≥ 1. Thus for t ≥ 1, rt = ξ(νtR) and
Mt
k(Y−Mt)+Mt = ψ(ν
t
R).
As in the proof of Proposition 5, a simple induction thus implies that if ν1R < ν
∗
R, then
νtR will be strictly increasing for t ≥ 1 and bounded from above by ν∗. Similarly, if ν1 > ν∗R,
then νtR will be strictly decreasing for t ≥ 1 and bounded from below by ν∗R. But since M t
is a monotonic function ζ(·) of νtR such that M∗ = ζ(ν∗R), the result follows.
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E Comparing Phase 1 and Phase 2 proposer offers
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Figure 7: Proposer offers in phase 1 and phase 2 of the Baseline Experiment.
F Regressions with differently coded experiences
In this section, we analyze whether our results on the effect of observational experience
and personal payoff experience are sensitive to their respective definitions. First, we have
measured observational experience and personal payoff experience simply as the respective
average over all 15 periods of phase 1. As an alternative to plain averaging, we consider
weighted averages, G(µτ ,ντ ) = g (
∑
δtµt/
∑
δt,
∑
δtνt/
∑
δt), which give more weight to
more recent periods in phase 1 of the experiment. Second, we have made assumptions about
observational experience in the Full Information treatment experiment as well as about
personal payoff experience in case of rejection, and we would like to check whether our
results are robust to changes in these assumptions.
Table 9 shows results of the same IV GMM regression that is presented in columns (5)
and (6) of table 6 of the paper, but uses alternative measures of personal payoff experience
and observational experience.
Two different weights have been used to construct the geometric averages: δ = 0.9 and
δ = 0.95. It can be seen that using geometric averages does not qualitatively alter our results.
Observational experience and personal payoff experience remain significant determinants of
responders minimum acceptable offers in phase 2 of the experiment. Also, the magnitude
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Table 9: The effect of discounted experiences on minimum acceptable offers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MAO MAO MAO MAO
Observational experience (δ = 0.9) 23.84*** 14.73***
(6.33) (4.62)
Personal payoff experience (δ = 0.9) 11.76** 10.12**
(5.14) (5.02)
Observational experience (δ = 0.95) 24.85*** 15.31***
(6.67) (4.84)
Personal payoff experience (δ = 0.95) 12.15** 10.46**
(5.32) (5.18)
Constant 32.03*** 39.44*** 31.89*** 39.32***
(4.74) (3.15) (4.79) (3.17)
Adj. R2 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05
Observations 222 3330 222 3330
Observational experience and personal payoff experience are geometric means of first period offers and payoffs.
The discount rate is either δ = 0.9 or δ = 0.95. All regressions are IV GMM regressions, similar to those
in table 6. Observational experience and personal payoff experience are instrumented using 6 dummies, one
for each market treatment and experiment. Columns (1) and (3) contain period 1 observations of phase 2
only. Columns (2) and (4) use data from all 15 periods. Standard errors are clustered at the phase 1 market
matching group level (30 clusters). Significance levels: ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5% and ∗∗∗ = 1%.
of the estimated coefficients remains quite stable. Consequently, our results on the impact
of observational experience and personal payoff experience are robust to alterations in the
construction of these measures.
Second, we had to make assumptions on experienced payoff shares in case of rejections,
i.e., when the total sum of payoffs is 0. In the paper, we have assumed that in these cases,
the personal payoff experience is equal to 0. An alternative intuition is that in an N -player
group, µti = 1/N when Π
t = 0, to reflect the possibility that when everyone gets the same
payoff (even when it’s zero) the player feels like it was such an equitable outcome that his
subsequent feelings of entitlement move towards him getting an even share of the surplus.
Additionally, in the Full Information experiment, all subjects received feedback about the
average offer in the RC and in the PC market. We have assumed that all subjects correctly
weight the information from the PC market twice as much as the information from the RC
market, reflecting the fact that there are twice as many offers comprised in the average
offer of the PC market. Alternatively, it is possible that subjects weigh these two pieces of
information equally. Consequently, we test the robustness of our results with regard to the
assumed observational experience of subjects in the Full Information experiment.
Table 10 replicates columns (5) and (6) of table 6 from the main paper using these alter-
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Table 10: Alternative codings of observational experience and personal payoff experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MAO MAO MAO MAO MAO MAO
Observational experience2 26.00*** 15.96*** 26.72*** 16.43***
(7.06) (5.11) (6.93) (4.97)
Personal payoff experience 12.59** 10.84**
(5.52) (5.36)
Observational experience 26.72*** 16.43***
(6.93) (4.97)
Personal payoff experience2 12.40** 10.92** 12.41** 10.92**
(5.48) (5.34) (5.48) (5.33)
Constant 31.71*** 39.16*** 31.26*** 38.83*** 31.26*** 38.83***
(4.84) (3.19) (4.74) (3.15) (4.74) (3.15)
Adj. R2 0.025 0.047 0.030 0.050 0.030 0.051
Observations 222 3330 222 3330 222 3330
Observational experience2 differs from observational experience in how observed offers in the Full Information
experiment are weighted. Observational experience gives 2/3 weight to the average offer in the PC market
and 1/3 weight to the average offer in the RC market, reflecting the fact that there are twice as many
proposers in the PC market. Observational experience2 weighs the average offers in the RC market and PC
market equally in each period. Personal payoff experience2 codes personal payoff experience as 1/3 in case an
offer is rejected by all subjects. Personal payoff experience, on the other hand, codes rejections as a personal
payoff experience of 0. All regressions are IV gmm regressions, similar to those in table 9. Observational
experience and personal payoff experience are instrumented using 6 dummies, one for each market treatment
and experiment. Columns (1), (3) and (5) contain period 1 observations of phase 2 only. Columns (2), (4)
and (6) use data from all 15 periods. Standard errors are clustered at the phase 1 market matching group
level (30 clusters). Significance levels: ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5% and ∗∗∗ = 1%.
native codings of personal payoff experience and observational experience. Personal payoff
experience2 is the recoded personal payoff experience variable and observational experience2
is the recoded observational experience variable. Columns (1)-(6) replicate the original esti-
mations in table 6 of the paper using different combinations of the recoded variables. Again,
it can be seen that our estimates are robust to these changes in the definition of observational
experience and personal payoff experience. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients is
remarkably stable, and observational experience and personal payoff experience remain sig-
nificant determinants of responders’ minimum acceptable offers independent of the precise
definition of these terms.
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G Ruling out Anchoring
As we note in section 4.3 of the paper, experimental evidence has shown that individuals can
be influenced by arbitrary anchors (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006; Kahneman and Tversky,
2000; Ariely et al., 2003; Simonson and Tversky, 1992), and that behavior that appears to be
consistent with expressing a particular preference can in fact be the result of arbitrary anchor-
ing.45 On the face of it, our path-dependence account may seem very similar to anchoring.
However, there is one crucial difference. We posit that past experience affects preferences,
and we further show that differences in preferences will affect behavior in environments such
as the Ultimatum Game, but that they will not affect behavior in competitive market games
as in phase 1 of our experiment (see Appendix A). In contrast, standard anchoring and
adjustment theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) does not make such a prediction. This
theory states that subjects’ choice of action (e.g., offer) starts at some anchor, and then is
incompletely adjusted toward the optimal choice of action. Formally, the choice of action is
given by a = (1 − κ)ϑ + κa∗ where ϑ is the anchor, a∗ is the optimal action, and κ ∈ [0, 1]
is the degree of adjustment away from the anchor. Such anchoring and adjustment theory
would predict that anchors should also have an effect in the market games.
Here, we provide evidence that suggests that behavior in our experiment is not driven
by the mere provision of arbitrary anchors. To show this, we exploit a design feature in
the Full Information experiment. In this experiment, all subjects received feedback about
the average offers in both the PC and the RC markets after every period during phase 1
of the experiment. If responders’ acceptance behavior were influenced by the provision of
arbitrary anchors, we should observe that responders in the RC market in the Full Infor-
mation experiment show higher acceptance rates than Responders in the RC market in the
Baseline or in the Role Switch experiment.46 This is the case because in the Full Information
experiment, they are subjected to higher anchors than in the Baseline experiment or in the
Role Switch experiment, in which responders only get to observe the offers made by their
matched proposer.
Table 11 contains information that tests whether the information provided in the Full
information experiment indeed provides an alternative anchor and consequently changes pro-
posers’ offers. Moreover, table 12 provides results from a probit regression that test whether
responders’ acceptance behavior is affected by the altered anchor in the Full Information
experiment. It turns out that neither proposers’ offers nor responders’ acceptance behav-
45See, however, Fudenberg et al. (2012) and List et al. (2013) for evidence questioning the robustness of
these anchoring effects.
46We restrict attention to the RC market because in the PC market, responders almost never reject both
offers, and hence there is not enough variance in the data to identify a potential impact.
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Table 11: OLS regressions on proposer offers
(1) (2)
Full info * PC Market 1.32 1.76
(0.98) (1.40)
Full info * RC Market –3.73 2.11
(3.61) (3.77)
PC Market 41.34*** 46.73***
(3.07) (3.40)
Constant 36.99*** 31.15***
(2.99) (3.17)
Adj. R2 0.69 0.72
Observations 3330 2430
OLS regression of proposer offers on treatment dummies and interactions. PC Market indicates observations
from the Proposer Competition market. Full info*PC Market is an interaction between a Full Information
experiment dummy and a proposer competition market dummy. Equivalently, Full info*RC Market is an
interaction between a Full Information experiment dummy and a responder competition market dummy.
Column (1) contains data from all 3 experiments. Column (2) only compares the Full Information experiment
and the Baseline experiment. Standard errors are clustered at the phase 1 market matching group level (30
clusters in columns (1) and (3), 22 clusters in columns (2) and (4)). Significance levels: ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5%
and ∗∗∗ = 1%.
ior in the Full Information experiment is statistically different from the respective behavior
in the Baseline or the Role Switch experiment. Interacting a Full Information experiment
dummy with both an RC market dummy and a PC market dummy yields insignificant and
economically very small coefficients, implying that proposer and responder behavior in nei-
ther the RC nor the PC market was affected by the altered anchor in the Full Information
experiment. Consequently, anchoring does not seem to be a driving force of behavior in our
experimental setting.
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Table 12: Probit regressions on responder acceptance decisions
(1) (2)
Accept Accept
Maxoffer 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Full info * PC Market –0.05 –0.01
(0.05) (0.04)
Full info * RC Market –0.00 –0.04
(0.03) (0.04)
PC Market 0.02 –0.04
(0.04) (0.08)
Adj. R2 0.23 0.21
Observations 3330 2430
Marginal Effects of a Probit regression of responder acceptance decisions on treatment dummies and inter-
actions. PC Market indicates observations from the Proposer Competition market. full info*PC Market is
an interaction between a Full Information experiment dummy and a proposer competition market dummy.
Equivalently, full info*RC Market is an interaction between a Full Information experiment dummy and a
responder competition market dummy. Maxoffer contains the best offer made to responders in a particular
round. In responder competition, there is only one offer. In proposer competition, it is the higher of the
two offers made. Column (1) contains data from all 3 experiments. Column (2) only compares the Full
Information experiment and the Baseline experiment. Standard errors are clustered at the phase 1 market
matching group level (30 clusters in columns (1) and (3), 22 clusters in columns (2) and (4)). Significance
levels: ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5% and ∗∗∗ = 1%.
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H The Full Information Experiment
Table 13: Minimum Acceptable Offers in the Full Information Experiment
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MAO MAO MAO MAO
PC Responder 11.55* 5.64
(6.11) (5.64)
Personal payoff experience 19.69 ** 9.62
(9.97) (9.27)
Constant 48.45*** 47.58***47.17 ***46.95 ***
(4.67) (3.90) (4.81) (3.98)
Adj. R2 0.01 0.03
Observations 87 1305 87 1305
Columns (1) and (2) show results of an OLS regression. Regressions include a dummy for proposer phase 1
market experience. Column (1) uses data from period 1 of phase 2 only. Column (2) uses all data. Columns
(3) and (4) show IV GMM regressions, in which payoff experience is instrumented using 6 dummies, one
for each market treatment and experiment. Observational experience cannot be included here because it
is constant across treatments in the Full Information experiment. Column (3) contains data from period 1
only. Column (4) contains data from all 15 periods. Standard errors are clustered at the phase 1 market
matching group level (18 clusters). Significance levels: ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5% and ∗∗∗ = 1%.
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I Phase 1 of the Role Switch and the Full Information
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Figure 8: Left Panel: Average offers over time under responder competition and under
proposer competition in phase 1 of the Role Switch experiment. Right Panel: Average offers
over time under responder competition and under proposer competition in phase 1 of the
Full Information experiment
The exogenous assignment to either the PC market or the RC market also had strong
effects on market outcomes and personal payoff experiences in the Role Switch and the Full
information experiment. Figure 8 shows average offers in phase 1 of both experiments for all
15 periods. Not surprisingly, a very similar pattern to phase 1 of the Baseline experiment
emerges. In both experiments, the difference in average offers between the RC market is
large. In an OLS regression of offers on a PC market dummy, offers on average differ by
35 chips in phase 1 of the Role Switch experiment and by 46 chips in the Full Information
experiment. Both differences are highly significant (p < 0.001).
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